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PREFACE
It is the purpose or this research to determine the contributing factors in the banking crises of 1907 and 1929-33.

The

latter crisis shows that precautions taken after the catastrophe
of 1907 were not auff1c1ent to avert one which proved even more
serious.

Thia study, however, is limited to those elements which

were responsible for the widespread breakdown of the banking
system.
D1s~u~aions

or

each of these crises and the legislation which

followed, occupied page after page of the country's newspapers
for days, weeks, and months.

All worthwhile periodical• carried

views of the nation's outstanding commentators.

The Congressioml

Record bore testimony of the debates which preceded all legislation.

Numerous other sources, both primacy and secondary, make

possible the weighing of evidence, which alone makes research of
value.

Thia material may be•found in the Chicago Public Library,

the Newberry Library, the Crerar Library, and in the library of
the First National Bank of Chicago.
G.ratitude !s hereby expressed to Reverend Joseph Roubik, S.J.,
and Dr. Paul Klniery for the interest shown by them in my work;
and in particular to Mr. John A. Zvetina for the many helpful
suggestions and constructive criticisms necessary to the writing
of this thesis.
Esther H. Calvert .
Chicago, February 1938
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INTRODUCTION'
Many reasons have been advanced regarding the Nation's
financial collapse in the year 1907.

The· theory or panic cycle•

promulgated by some is given little credence.

Comparative

atu~

hoaever, or the tangible reasons, through the use ot contemporaneous materials, replace abstract ideas with concrete tacts.
From these facts we hope to arrive at the real solution or our
problem.
Because the banking problem 1s so very pertinent to our
·subject, the entire first chapter la given over to that field,
only to the extent which will serve to make meaningful the
related matter.

The panic of 1907 is dealt with in a more de-

tailed manner, tor too much

emphaa~s
\-.,..,,(}

fact that

!t was

not

a

/,'

I

,

)

cannot be laid upon the

..,,

chance happening nor the result or care-

fully laid plans, but the outcome or a faulty banking system.
The reforms which follow are merely the answer to a direct tieed
.
/

pe~~le
.· /< . ,._. (" ., ·' ;., /~

to safeguard the rinances of the
\\

and nation.
L< ,

\With the Stock Market crash .or October, 1929, subsequent
1nvest1gat1one and 1ncreae1ng bank failures, the average citizen
•as again made aware of the unstable financial structure or the
nation's banking

institutions~] Once more was seen the need tor

legislation which would tend to make more secure the savings of

those whose earnings bad been placed in those institutions for
safe keeping.

This takes us to a discussion of the Glass-

steagall Bill, an amendment which modifies the Federal Reser'Ve
Act, and which was passed during the
~

well as the Banking Act of 1933.

Hoove~

administration; as

A comparative study of the

crises will briefly digest the foregoing material, oa.111ng attention, in particular, to underlying causes, similarities and dissimilarities, and remedial measures.

CHAPTER I.
HISTORY OF BANKING PRIOR TO 1907 - - - - - - The First United States Bank••Second United
States Bank--Preaident Jackaon•e oppoe1t1on-Pet Banka--The National Banking Syatem--Uae of
bank depoaite tor induatrial expansion.

CHAPTER I.
HISTORY OF BANKING PRIOR TO 1907
It was during the Presidency of Washington that Alexander

Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, fostered the idea of a
national bank as a means of improving the national credit of the

new government.

Such an institution he claimed would be instru-

mental in the sate keeping

or

public funds, transmission of

public monies, collection of revenue, and in the making of loans~
In his "Report on a National Bank", which may be found in The
Works of Alexander Hamilton, is the statement " ••• it is the mani-

fest design and scope

or

the Constitution, to vest in Congress

all the powers requisite to the effectual administration of the
finances of the United States ••• banks are the usual engine in
the administration of national finances • • • • .. 2
Just as there bad been opposition to the adoption of the
\Constitution because of its centralizing tendencies, there was
oppoait1on to the bank.

Its Republican opponents headed by

Jefferson, maintained that the Constitution contained no prov1sicn
1 • Great ·Debates in American Histoi:z, edltsed by Marion M. Miller

tcurrent Literature Pub. Co., N. Y., 1913) Vol. 13. p~ 32
2 • The Works ot Alexander Hamilton, Comprisifif His Most Im~tant otHclal Reports, (Williams and w t!ng,.....-;-y-:; 1810)
p.

ig2.

l.

2.

empowering Congress to Create the bank. 3
With the success of the Federalists, however, the act 1noorporating the First United States bank in accordance with the plan
submitted by Hamilton, made possible the opening of a central
bank at Philadelphia on December 12, 1791.
period of twenty years.

4

Its charter was for a

We will not concern ourselves with its

operations, but will move on hurriedly to the year 1808 when the
shareholders began to petition for the renewal of the charter
which was to expire in 1811.

Note only was this opposed by the

adherents to the policy of strict construction of the Constitut1ai,
but by the political enemies ot Gallatin, Secretary of the
Treasury.

He, in his report to the Senate, had stated that the

Bank was "wisely and skillfully managed", and had urged that its
charter be renewed. 5
There was also an unfriendly attitude on the part of the
many state banks which had been established since 1790, and which
kept an eye to their own interests.a
Principles ,.2! Money, Credit

~

According to Roy Garia,

Banking, a motion to postpone

action on rechartering the bank was passed 65 to 64, on January
24, 1811.

On February 20, 1811 a similar bill was passed in the

~•Harold R. Bruce, American Parties !ru! Polit1ca,(Henry Holt and

'-B~v!sNA.Y~6tiy~>Fina~§!al Hiatofl ot
s,•ans, Green and Co. N• Y• 1 192 • p.-

the United States, LongTOU.
!_bad.,p. 126, See a1so Roy L. Garis, Princ1Elea or Money, Credit
!!!_ Banking, Macmillan Co.,
l93i, P• 3S. ~
6•Dewey,
p. 126.
I

N.Y.,

3.

senate, against the bank, at which time the Vice-President voted
7
against it in order to break a tied vote of 17 to 17.
Then came the War of 1812, and a disordered condition fol-

lowed making apparent the need of a banking institution which
would exert a stabilizing influence upon the Government by
1 upplying

financial revenue to the Treasury Department, and by

restoring a national currency or circulating medium.

The Govern-

ment had been forced to depend upon state banks, and when these
bad

suspended specie payments, the Treasury operations were

paralyted. 8
It was at thia time that John

c.

Calhoun of South Carolina,

despite his former viewpoint or strict construction, became a
etaunch advocate of the measure which would charter the second
bank.

He intimated that it might be a means of compelling state

banks to return to specie payments.

This he did by focusing the

attention of the members of the House of Representatives upon the
provision in the Constitution whereby Congress waa empowered to
regulate the currency or the United States. 9 After much pro and
,.22!! debate, the bank was rechartered on April 10 1 1816, and began

operations on January 7, 1817.
were similar.
V•Garis,

p:

Charter provisions of both banks

The first bad established eight branchea, whereaa

539~

-· ----

--------· -------

a.Charles A. Conant, A H1sto~ of Modern Banks Sl!, Ieeue, G. P.
Putnamsta Sons, N. !., 191 , p; 341.
9 •Great
Debate• !a American H1atorz, Vol. 13, PP• 54•55.

4.

th• second operated twenty•five.
one authority states, nthe Bank of the United States fell

because so great an institution in a representative republic
could not escape political entanglements and the auep1oion or
th• abuse or power.• 10 so.it is that we find hostility arising
in 1829 when President Andrew Jackson questioned the wisdom
rechartering it.

or

Behind his attitude lay political intrigue

which prompted bis condemnation ot the 1nst1tut1on.

In hie

annual message to congress in 1829 1 he said, "Both the constitutionality and expediency

or

the law creating the bank are

well questioned by a portion of our fellow citizens •••"
Thus the bank became one of the lasuea ot the campaign
and with Jackson's victory came the removal

or

11

or

1832,

its funds to

aelected state or "Pet bank••"

About this time many state banka expanded their note c1roula t1on and became involved in land speculations.

Then came

the accompanying collapse of 1837, with the suapenaion of

10 ·conant, P• 349.
It might be said that the Supreme Court had passed on the
issue of chartering a bank 1n two oaaea, McCUlloch va
Maryland and Oaborn va Bank. See Walter Dodd, Oaaee and
t~5~yri8:•se-i!!J8n~'!:ut1onal ~ (West Pub. Oo., St.'Taul,
1l•James A.• Richardaon, A Com,1lat1on ot the Meaaa~ea and
Papers or the Presidents l 89-1897,-YuO:-by Aut~or1~ot
~ongreai'; ivm:>. Vol. 2, pp;-16~28-9,· 576-91. See alao
Dewey, p. 200.

5.

ipecie payments by banks 1n all sections of the country. 12
It has been noticed that change• in our banking structure
result from national emergencies.

So the national banking s7a-

tem prior to its modification by the Federal Reserve Act, was an
outgrowth
war.

or

the financial oriaia which accompanied the Civil

Here we had the work of Chase, Secretary

1 ponsored

by President Lincoln.

or

the Treasury,

According to Dr. E.

~.

Gcldenweiser, Director, Division of Research and Statistics

or

the Federal Reserve Board, "Banking, 1n the years between 1846
and 1863, when the national system was initiated, waa under .the
laws of the several atates ••• Under the national banking system,
currency issues were safe but rigidly 1nelast1c."13
The national banking system was not at all satisfactory but
despite agitation for reform, the inconveniences and hardships of
the cr1s1s of 1907 had to be undergone before any concerted ef-

fort wae made to remedy the a1tuat1on.14 Because of the decentralized nature of the banking ayatem, banks had no means of
oooperat1ng or acting jointly in times

or

stress.

Too, there

was no manner by which the scattered reserves of the bank• might
be mobilized at such a time. 15
12 ·E. A. Goldenwe1eer,nH1gh11ghs in History of .American Bankillg
Legislation", Con,reaaional Digest, Munsey Bldg., Waah. D.C •.
l 3 (Dec. 1931) Vol. O, P• 292.
•congress1onal D1~est, (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10, P• 292.
14.Fr~der!ck A. Bra ford, Money ~ Banking, Longmans, Green and
~~., N.Y., 1936, P• 327.
15.Roy L. Garis, Principles of Mon7i' Credit and Banking,
Macmillan Co., N. Y., 1§34; P•
2.
~

e.
It may be w1ae to pauee here and. conaider the nature ot the
lnY••tmenta made b7 the 1nat1tut1ona known aa banka.

Between the

,-ar• 1850 and 1900, bankers permitted oorporationa which were
building ra1lrao4a, or were engaged 1n mining and manut acturine;,
,0

borrow much money.

S1noe there waa not enough mone7 in

,_.r1oa to develop ita natural reaourcea aa rapic1l7 aa waa
d"alred, ma111 Europeane, part1cular17 the Bngl1eh 1 loaned. large
tum• to Carnegie and Rooketeller.

Banker• were inat:rumental in

bringing thia money trom Europe and putting it to work in devel•
oping American lnduatl"y.

J. P. Morgan waa such an 1ntermed1•1"'1•

'l'b1• industrial activity aerved to increase the wealth ot the

American people, and their depoaita began to 1ncreaae.

Thua by

1900 1 bankers had become "Maetera ot Induetrr and Capital• be•

oauee they controlled, •••n though they did not own. those
1nduatr1ea which had been heavy bol'l"owera.
For at least six years preceding the panic it had been
known tb.at a few oapitaliata had been actively engased in apeGulat1ve 1nduatr1al schemes ot their own, gaining therebJ' control ot
a group ot banks through mere stock ownership.

They controlled

the board of directors and uaed the tunda of these banks 1n
their own deala.

Truat companies had entered the general tield

ot banking aleo.

Banke which were subject to 1netant call

ror

caah by their depositor• were not permitted 1nve:stments which
COUld not be converted quickly into cash.

Trust companies were

7.

not considered subject to such demands.

Despite this distinction,

·'IOIJ11Y trust companies had accepted deposits, undertaking to carry
on the same kind of business the banks were doing. 16
It was in 1908 that .Andttew Carnegie spoke

system as being the worst in the world.17

or

our banking

We find outselvea

wondering whether or not he may have had such conv1ot1ona prior
to the crisis of 1907, when the New York Clearing House demanded
that trust companies keep a fifteen per cent cash reserve 1n
their vaults, if they wished clearn1ng house privileges.
the exception

or

With

a few, however, the trust companies rejected

the ultimatum, saying that they were strong enough to clear for
themselvee.18

Then came the crash which proved their weakness.

16.Arthur M. Schlesinger, Political and Social History ot the
United States 1829·1925 {iacm.!1!an-a-o., N. Y7, 1929)"1).~9.
17.0utiook, out!oOlf'"'C'o-;;-R'. Y., (Feb. 1908) Vol. as, PP• 487-89.
~ee also The N!tion, New York Evening Post Co., N. Y.,
(Dec. 2e.-,:ga11 Vol. as, P• sao.
la.The Nation, (Oct. 31, 1907) Vol. 85, P• 387.

----

CHAPTER II.
THE BANKING CRISIS IN THE PANIC OF 1907-Cauae-•Effect upon the nation as a whole-Need for remedial legislation.

CHA?rER II.

THE BANKING CRISIS IN THE PANIC OF 1907

Every panic calls for its presidential scapegoat, so by

many, the one ot 1907 is attributed to prosecutions carried on
by President Theodore Roosevelt aga1net illegal eomb1nat1ona.

Thie, however, was not a juat accusation for he had no part in
setting in motion the destructive machinery of Wall Street.

Most

contemporary writers expreae this view.

an

Even the

Spect~,

English publication ot the period, when commenting on the
".American wheel ot credit• and the President's treatment ot
financial magnates, refutes the idea.l

In the years preoed1ng

the panic there had been a most unusual expansion throughout the
world.

One writer anticipating a erials, 1e., the eollapae

or

the money market, believed it would be due to excessive enterprise; and aa early as 1906 had suggested two ways to avert disaster, namely: check the paoe of enterprise; provide sufficient
funds to make ·a money famine 1mpossible. 2
1 •spectator Ltd., edited by John Baker, London. (October 1907)
P• 593.
2 ·N. Johannsen, !h!. Coming Cr1a1a ~ ~ !2, !!!!!, It, w. Y. 1907.
a pampblet.

a.

The symptoms of the approaching crisis were:

wonderful

prosperity as shown by enterprises and schemes of all sorts; rise
in the prices of all commoditiea: request tor workmen and the
r1•• in salaries; growing luxury; small reserve in specie and
decreasing deposite. 3 It was Paul M. Warburg, author of!!!!,

-

Federal Reserve System !E!. Origin !!!.9. Growth, who, when speaking

ot the panic

or

1907, stated,

or the American
banking system at that time that, while disasters
of this kind were the automatic consequences ot
over-expansion, there was no posa1b111ty ot averting them by timely preventive collective action.
There was no government or private authority that
could assume leadership in warning the country or
that had actual power to put on the brakes if the
car were moving too fast and heading tor the
preo1p1ce."4

"It was one of the tragic defects

our concrete example deals with the activities

or

an am•

bit1ous Montana miner by the name of F. Auguatus Heinze.

He had

lost heavily through the failure ot the Amalgamated syndicate

which had btien sponsored by the National City Bank ot New York
City, and financed by J. P. Morgan.

Mr. Heinze had then forced

two high finaneiera, Jamee Stillman, preaident of the City Bank,
and Henl'J" H. Rogers, director

or

Standard 011, to make a large

t1nancial settlement to him, thereby humiliating themaelvea.

then took his millions to New York and combined with Charles

He

w.

3•Clement Juglar, A Brief Historz ot Panics and Their Periodical
Occurrence in the uri!ted Sta tea Tl. }S. f>utiiiii• a Sons, N. Y.

!916) PP• 7-:Yo-;--

4•Paul M. Warburg, The Federal Reserve Slatem _!!!, Or1,1n and
Growth, Macmillan-ec:>., N. !., 1§30. Vo • I. PP• 1!- 6. ·

J

10.
Jorae, a shipping magnate, Ruaaell Thomae, a well-to-do sportsman,
.,id Charles T. Barney, president of the Knickerbocker Trust Com-

pany, which had reserves or more than seventy million dollars.5
The old line trust companies which were dominated by J.
Pierpont Morgan and his partner, Robert Bacon, by William Rocketeller, a speculator, by Henry Rogers and James Stillman, could

not sit idly by and watch the encroachment or this new banking
group upon their long established monarchj". 6
The year 1907 had opened with a strained money market, as
was shown by the Hew York Stock Market which is the barometer or
business conditions.

Despite the disturbing element, 1.e.,

President Roosevelt's attitude toward unacrupuloua men

or

wealth,

the Heinze, Morse, Thom.as combine made heavy loan.a in an attempt
to corner the market on United Copper. 7

Five days preceding the historic date which marked the
beginning

or

the panic, the !!.!! York Dally Tribune carried a

front page article captioned, "Big Copper Crash Sends Firm To
Wall."

The firm referred to was that of Gross and Kleeberg, al-

leged Heinze brokers.

They stated that they had bought stock tor
the Heinze people who now refused to take it off their handa. 8

The next day's issue contained two items which bore a direct
5•Charlea A. Collman, Our ~sterioua Panics 1830•1930, William
Morrow and co., N.Y.;-!93 .p. 268. Sei aliiOlr.S. Glaasock, The
War of the Cof!er Kin~a, Builders of Butte, and Wolves ot
---Wi!l ~triit,he Bob a Merrill co-:-N.Y., 19~ chapterS-21-22.
6.C'Oiiman, P• 268.
7.101a.
8,!!!!, !.2.£! Daily Tribune, Oct. 17, 1907.

ll.

relationship.

One, "Otto Heinze and Compan7 forced to suspend",

and the other, "F. Augustus Heinze gives up bank pres1dency. 0
Ill'• Heinze had been elected president ot the Mercantile National

sank in January, after the Heinze, Morse, Thomas combination took
over the Gould interests.

Although he had already denied any

personal interest in the market position of United Copper,
Heinze gave as his reason tor resigning that, his brothers• firm
now in difficulty, needed all his attention.

Othera in the bank-

ing circle were of the opinion that because his brothers were

identified with the United Copper corner and the manipulations
which brought about its collapse, Heinze had considered it best

to retire from the presidency.9
This was just the opening which his enemies bad sought.
Immediately, they called loans on all securities of all companies with which Heinze, Morse and Thomas were associated.
Under pressure, the directors of the Mercantile Bank resigned,
tor even though the bank was found to be solvent, aid waa denied
it by the Clearing House Committee until a change in stock control
had been etfeoted.lO
The Clearing House Committee 1 s 1nveat1gat1on did not atop
here.

They thought it wise to assertain the status of other

aasociated institutions.

While so doing they discovered that

9•New York Daill Tribune, Oct. 18, 1907. See also Hearings Before
·S' mi.ttee on Bankl!!f and Currencl, United States Senate,
~cong.I. Sess. aov•t~rlnt. 5r?1ce, 1~13,
10!!!
~ Daill Tribune, Oct. 19, 1907.

Vol.

3.pp.~7ao-64

12.
tb• position of the Kniokerboeker Trust Company was dangerous.

Charles T. Barney, ita president, resigned saying that in such
perilous times be felt that the

b1 someone elae.

poa~t1on

could be better tilled

Be claimed that the institution waa sound and

that he was unaware or any refusal ot the National Bank of Commerce to continue clearing from the Knickerbocker Trust Com.p&nY•

11

But, when the Knickerbocker applied for aid, auoh waa

denied it, and it waa forced to close 1ta doors.
at that time considered the most formidable run

Thua, what was

or

bank deposi-

tors 1n the history of banking, followed the enforced retirement
ot Barney. 12
Alexander D. Noyea, in the January 1908 issue of the Forum,
appropriately stated, ua1story will set the beginning of the
1907 panic on October 22, the day the iliickerbocker Trust Company

closed ita doors ••• the date when the public first ehowed

signs of the sudden collapse of depoaitors• confidence which
marked the series ot troubled weeks which tollowed.nl3 The
Chicago Da1!Y' Tribune,

~t

this time conveyed. the new1 that Gotham

was on the br1nk,o.t a Pl\llic; and that President Theodore
Roosevelt; while speaking at Nashville; Tenneaaee, made it clear
that he was 1n no manner responsible tor the t1nano1al situation
and general uneasinesa.14

A portion ot this apeeoh read;

ll•Forum, Forum Pub. Oo., N. Y., (Jan. 1908) P• 297.
York Dail! Tribune, Oct. 22, 1907.
ll~·New
"'• F'Orum--;-TJan• 90'7) p. 294.
14.cfiicago Daill Tribune, Oct. 23, 1907.

13.
• ••• these policies of mine can be summed up in one brief sen•tence.

They represent the effort to punish sucoeastul dishonesty.

••• All I did waa to turn on the light.

I am responsible tor

turning on the light, but I am not responsible tor what the light

It was impossible to cut out a cancer without making the

abowed.

patient reel for a few days sicker than he ·relt before."15
At Washington. however, the entire financial machine aet to
work to do whatever possible to avert widespread financial ditfi•
oulties.

These otticials and bakera were of the opinion that the

disturbance could be confined to the Bew York area.

Secret&...""'7 of

the Treasury, Corteltou, went to Hew York• and after conferring
with leading bankers and financiers on the local banking situat

tion, deposited $1,000,000.00 ot government mone7 1n each of six
or seven national banks ot that city.

Not one penny of aid was
given the Knickerbocker Truet Company trom outside eourcea. 16
· The Chicago banks aa yet experienced no dift1cultiea, but

they kept in cloae touch with the New York situation.

On

Thursday, October 24, news came that the trouble which began in

Bew York, had spread to Pittsburg• but that the Chicago banka
were still solid.
good fortune:
lating

in

The following reason was given tor Chicago's

"Chicago banka have not been and are not specu-

real estate ••• A corps of special bank examiners

15. New York Dailz Tribune, Oct. 23., 1907.
16. Ibid.

-

14.

employed by the Chicago Clearing House Aasoe1at1on keeps the
association's committee informed of an1 irregularities in the
o1,t1' s banks at their inception.

Thus, no costly deception could

iong continue in any bank.•17
According to a London publication,
cable to the

Chioa~o

beyond reproach.

!.!.!!.

Dailz Telegraph, vi•

Da1lz Tribune, "Mr. Roosevelt's object is

He desires to strike at the gu1lt7 and di••

honest in high places ••• But ia 1t abaolutel7 neceeaa17 that the
sky should be dragged down in,order to catch the few larka that
1r. Rooaevelt is bent on nett1ngt• 18 Thie brief expression
leads one to believe that the English viewpoint was that despite
his good intentions, the Pree1dent•e anti-truat speeches pre,

c1p1tated the panic.
Glancing here and there over the country by an examination

ot news articles• the banking conditions in the leading cities
were still favorable.

New England conditions were about the

same as before the collapse

or

the Heinze Oopper corner,

Philadelphia was unaffected; Ohio waa serene; Indiana banks were
able to supply the legitimate demands of their customers, while

St. Louie and Kanaaa Cit7 were unperturbed.

Minneapolis declared

herself nr1rm and stable•, while the Dakotas were in tine shape.

17. ChiC!SO Dall~ Tribune, Oct. 24, 1907.
18. !bfd. 1 Oct. 5, 1907.

-

15.

Atlanta boasted of normal bank withdrawals; New Orleans was una1armed and Memphis was ready to meet any emergency.

The Rocky

10unta1n states were not disturbed, for Portland, Los Angeles and
san Francisco were in a condition to lend money to the east if it

were needed.
The next day told a different story.

Goldfield, Nevada

banks closed in consequence of the governor's proclamation of a
holiday.

This was a relief to local banks because of runs and

the closing of the State Bank.

Runs also occurred in Baltimore,

Maryland, and Providence, Rhode Ialand.19
The monied men of New York began to express themselves and

J. Pierpont Morgan avered that the fight had been practically
won, and that the people should keep their heads.

John D.

Rockefeller intimated that depositors, big and little, should

turnish money to remedy the muddle, 1.e., become composed and let
money work as usual.

E. H. Harriman declared the New York banks

to be sound and able to stand, it the people stood by them.
too, urged tolerance, prudence and coolneas. 20

He,

A tew days later the President congratulated Mr. Cortelyou,
and the financiera who aided him in the crisis.

From the White

House he wrote, 1•My Dear Mr. Cortelyou ••• The action taken by
you and by the business men in question, has been of the utmost

19. Chicago Dailz Tribune, Oct. 25 1 190'7.
20. ...............
!bid •

16.

consequence and has secured opportunity tor the calm consideration which must inevitably produce entire confidence in our
bus1nes~ conditions.•21 Despite these statements by t1nanc1ers

and by the President, unrest and bank runs continued and some
banks began to require notice tor withdrawals.
By cable from London came a news item from London Eoonomista
Frank

w.

Hirst, editor of the Economist, and George Paiah, edi-

tor of the Statist, claiming that American business had gone

ahead of cash, but that the depression would not laat long.

In

discussing the way London differed trom New York, they said,
"(1) we dontt deposit money 1n sham banks.
speculate.

(~)

(2) Our banke do not

We have a sound banking syetem.

(4) Engliahmen•a

nerves are not so lightly strung as Americana and consequently
there is not so much histronica here during temporary diaarrangement. "22
From Paris came the comments of French financial writers on
America's monetary or1sis 1 conveying the idea that they, too,
held President Roosevelt aa the key to the situation.

Said one,

"Becoming politically important accidentally and late in life, he
plunged head down into a study of all sooial1st1c theories ••• It
is the ill fortune

or

Preaident Roosevelt and .the

Amer1~ana

those dreams presented themselves to his mind first atter he

21. Chicago Dailz Tribune, Oct. 27. 1907.
22.· Ib!d.

-

that

17.
reached power and was in position to make them effective."

Said

another, "He excites popular envy and legislates not tor the
future, but to draw a crowd around h1m.n23
Claiming he had brought the country to the brink of ruin,
Roosevelt was blamed in unmeasured terms, in the highest German
banking circles, for the panic.

A director of an institution

having extensive American relations, said, '*We hold the President
solely responsible ror agitating public opinion and undermining
public confidence in what is a perfectly sound situation.

He

seems to have forgotten Rockefellers, Morgans, and Harriman.a,
can lose millions without feeling it but ••• that there are tens

ot thousands to whom this upheaval will mean eternal ruin.n24
At the same time trom Berlin came a statement, "The violent fin&.J.t.
c1al squall in the United States is regarded here as having
passed.

The

great Berlin banks are assuring their customers

that the cr1e1a which tor a week has gripped New York is relaxing
and that conditions in America are so sound that no deep seated
consequences can tollow.n25

Clearing Bouse Cert1t1catea were resorted to as a meane ot
bringing about normal oond1t1ona.

Such a certificate is

emergency currenc7 to be used by banks only, secured b7
collateral which is accepted at aevent7-five per cent of its

23. Chicago Da1lz Tribune, Oct. 27. 1907.
24. !bra.
25. New ~ork Da1lz Tribune, Oct. 28, 1907.

.18.

face value.

Unlike the bank note its use is restricted to payment of daily balances· at the olearning house. 26 New York, st.
Louis, Pittsburgh, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago, Milwaukee, Omaha and Indianapolis issued such cert1f1oatea. 27
Their use showed the need for currency retorm.

Since they

prevented the withdrawal of large sums, money was kept in Chicago
banks, and few depositors sought to withdraw funds.

In New York,

although runs on banks had not ended, demands were being met.

So,

with affairs on the upgrade, London, Paris and Berlin began to
wax optimistic over this "rich manta cr1s1a and poor man's pan1<l.n28
Taking every precaution to avoid any acts which might

disturb the calm which had begun to settle upon hie city,
Comptroller Meta of New York CitJt held back part of the eala17
checks usuall7 paid on the first of the month, deciding to distribute

~hem

over five daya.

Hie purpose was to prevent a renewal

of any reeling of disquiet which might accompany the apectacle ot

long lines

or

policemen, firemen, school teachers, street sweepere,

and other city employees dashing 1n the thirty-five city depositories on Saturday. 29

By October 31st, the financial skies seemed to be free from
clouds, for reports from all sections of the country, to the

nn1if
Tribune, oct. 28, 1907.
a I Tribune, Oct. 28, 1907.

26. Chicago
27. Rew York

28. Clilca:go-Da!lt Tribune, Oct. 29, 1907.

29.

New York Dil l Tribune• Oct. 31, 1907.

19.

government officials, showed rapid improvement.

Not one demand

for Clearing House assistance came that day from New York.
ouring the next two days the press carried auch statements as,

"America has grown taster than means provided for ita development ••• More bank notes will ease the strain", and, "Crisis 1s

iever to money reform.

Need for a more elastic currency 1a em-

phasized by the recent financial disturbanoe--preaent system
1nade qua te • u 3 0
The natural tendency of individuals during a panic is to
bold on to all cash, thus making a condition which is alread1'
bad, worse.

It is therefore necessary to devise some plan to

draw this boarded currency out or biding.

So it was that Wall

Street brokers advertised an offer to pay 1n certified cbeoka on

New York banka; a premium of one and one•halt per cent tor any
kind of currency.

Employers of labor with their large weekly or

monthly payments could not wait until o,aah became more plentiful,
and it was they, direotly or indirectly through their banka 1 who

had employed the Wall Street broker• to announce the premium for

.

The result was successful for soon the boarded money
began to appear. 31
currency.

Presidef?.t Roosevelt was urged to C·all Congreea.

The White

House was. deluged with petitions asking national action
30.
31.

Chicago Daill Tribune, Nov. 2, 1907.
Nov. 1907) Vol. 85.

The Nation,

on

the

20.
tinancial crisis, but the President did not feel that the situation justified the calling of a special session.

He did, how-

ever, decide to aid currency reform and to recommend that
congress devise some plan tor greater elaat1o1ty in the circulating medium.

It was only a few days later that Mr. Meyer, head

of the Government Mail Department, made hie plea for postal
eavings banks, and explained how euoh a project would tend to
promote prosperity within the United Statea. 32
Summarizing•, we might say that the conditions which brought
on the crisis had accumulated over many years.

Nowhere had over•

trading and over-expanding been greater than in the. United
1

States, and though some sort of let down may have occurred, it

need not have taken the .form of a pan1c;.1f a better banking and.
currency system had existed.
As one peruse a articles which have b•um written on this par'..

ticular crisis, contemporaneous and otherwise, one finds himself
being convinced that it was a rich maxi•a panic: that it was the

mon1ed people, those who have always controlled the Stock Ex•
change, who suffered; not the people at large.

No sane person

can be of the opinion that the collapse was a planned atrkir even
though the unfortunate bicker1ngs in Wall Street supplied the
necessary· momentum, serving thus ae the immediate ,oauae.

~2. Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 6, 1907.

21.

New York, the money center of the country, reflected an in•
fluence upon the nation as a whole, with the exposure of the
speculative practices

or

men high 1n finance.

The reaction ot

small depositors was a natural one, as was that ot the western
banks in reducing their tunds at the eastern center.
dawn

or

With the

the new year the financial scare faded, and as the money

outlook improved, the business world again became optimistic,
but as Senator Bourne, before Congress on March 5, 1910, refuting
the prediction of the junior Senator of New York that other
panics would come, stated, "under normal conditions there will be
no more panics in this country if capital 1a properly regulated ••• n33

33. Congressional Record, !!!, Cong.

!•

Seas. P• 2763.
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CHAPTER III.
THE POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM

We now come to the first of the banking reforms resulting
from the collapse of 1907, namely, the creation of the United
states Postal Savings System.

An extract from pamphlets issued

by the United States Poat-office Department reads, "Between 1873

and 1910, eighty bills relating to the eatabl1shment of postal
savings were introduced in Congre•a, the last of which was enacted into law in 19lo.n1 That the law was enacted is well and
good, but let us consider the arguments which were used in an at•
tempt to prevent it, and those which helped bring about ita
enactment.
During a period
ment

or

or

approxi~ately

forty years, the establish-

such a system had been advocated by eight Postmaster

Generals, but it was considered a matter of minor importance until the pan1.c exposed the general lack of confidence in the
existing banking institutions.

That President Roosevelt favored

the system was indicated in his December 1907 and March 1908
messages to Congreas. 2

l.

2.

Con.greaaional Di~eat, (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10, P• 296.
E. w. Kemmerer,oatal Savings, Princeton Univ. Presa. 1917
PP• 2•4.

·

22.

23.

In

!a!

Independent ot November 5, 1908, we tind an article

bf Mr. George Von L. Meyer, Postmaster General ot the United
states, "Much Needed Legislation", in which he says,
" ••• there 1a a timid class which has only faith
in Goverrosient institutions •• The Republican
platform commits the Republican party to the
adoption ot a postal savings bank law ••• The
Department has had assurance that more than a
majority or the Senate will support the bill ••
Whetever opposition there may be to the proposition by banking institution.a ia f'rom misunderstanding of its purposes or trom purely selfish motives."3
Mr. Charles E. Sprague, former president of the savings bank
1ection of the American Bankers Aasoc1at1on; waa one to disagree
with Mr. Meyer1.

Hie view was that .few teared the ultimate

solvency of the banks in 1907 1 but they wanted currenc7 at once.
Therefore he claimed that peraona would have been just as eager
to draw money trom. postal banks, to hoard or to sell that money,
as any other money.

It this had been the case he believed the

1

Government would have had to retuse payment even though it had
4
agreed to repay upon demand.
About the same time in the December 12th Outlook,. was an
item which ma7 have served to oryatalize public opinion.

It

referred to the millions of dollar which were kept in hiding in
those regions which lacked proper banking facilities, and had

s.
A•

~

George Von L. Meyer, "Much Needed Legislation," The Inde(Nov. 5, 1908) Vol. 65 PP• 1029-30.
--- ~
harlea E. Sprague, "Postal Savings Banks", The Independent,
(Jan. 14, 1909) Vol. 66, P• 1549.
---

~endent,

00

confidence in private bankers.

24.
If post-offices were allowed

to receive these savings on deposit the condition of economic
waste would be relieved, for hoarded money would again oircu-

1ate. 5

Persons who began saving small amounts in the postal

1 av1ngs

banks, would, as their deposits grew, realize the advan-

tage of depositing in a regular savings bank, because of the
higher interest rate.

In this way the poatal institutions would
be or aid to the established banka. 6
Again, however, we find opposition.

Mr. John Harsen

Rhoades, a trustee ot one of the leading savings institutions in
the city or New York, objected to the principle and methods
which would be employed.

He had the idea that such a system

would increase the centralized

powe~a

ot the Federal Government,

and stated that he had a distaste for anything like Government

there existed no dangerous tendency toward centralization of

absorption of private enterprise.

'

The Outlook opinion waa that
..

'

power in the Federal Government, and that people didn•t resent
Government management 1t it were more effective than private
management.7
When d1acuaa1ng the Carter Bill which waa then before Congress. Mr. Rhoades stated, "The time may arrive when postal
eavings banks will be a necessary adjunct to our financial life;
but, inasmuch as today our national banking system ia antiquated

-5.
6,

7.

Outlook, (Dec. 12, 19085 Vol. 90. P• 802. ed.

'.td.

-

!bid., (Jan. 16, 1909) Vol. 91, P• 99 ed.
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and inadequate to our needs, why saddle upon it a weight of a
postal savings project?

Would it not be well for those interes-

ted in establishing postal savings banks to bide their time and
wait until our system of banking has improved?

Banking and currency reform should precede the postal savings bank.n 8
In refutation of arguments presented by those who opposed

his project, Mr. Thomas B. Carter, sponsor of the bill, spoke
well in its defense•

He said,

nA cursory examination of the map and of the laat

census returns will demonstrate that approximately
one-half ot the total population of the United
states ab1dea in places having no savings banks at
all. Since it is conceded that savings .fac111t1ea,
coupled with confidence in the banks, will encourage thrift, keep money in circulation, insure more
home comforts, and develop better citizenship, the
queat1on naturally ariaes. Why not make so.me ef ....
fort to extend the ben1f1cent influence of sound
savings 1nst1tutiona to the one-halt of our population which does not now enjoy the advantages
common to those residing in or near the great
centers of population? Certain cherished tao111t1es for saving small amounts of money now enjoyed
by some ot the people can be extended to all the
people in a lawful way and without expense to the
Government or injury to anyone, and the postal
system has the macbine27 installed and in operation thru which such facilities may be extended
to the patrons or every one ot the 40,000 postotficea in the country."9

When Kansas City, Missouri postal otficiala were making an
investigation, to ascertain why large numbers of money orders
8. John Haraen Rhoades, •postal Savings Banks", Outlook,(Jan.1909)
Vol. 91, P• 118.
9. Thomas H. Carter, "Postal Savings Banks•, I!!!. Independent,
(Jan. 1909) Vol. 66. PP• 74•75.

26.
bad not been presented for payment, they discovered that immigrant laborers had been using the post-office as a savings bank.
They had become familiar with such in Europe and, having a

distrust of American banks, had followed the example of one of
their group.

This clever man would buy money orders which, if

not presented tor payment in a year, were turned over to the
Treasury department where a
order was made out.

ce~~1f1cate

tor the amount of the

Such a certificate, non interest bearing,

was good indefinitely.

Thus, the Government became his banker.lo

For over seventy days the bill was under consideration by
the Sixtieth Congress and was then passed on to 1ta successor,
the Sixty-first Congress.

In the course

legitimate objection was presented.

ably and zealously re.futed. 11

or

the debate every

These were, however, just as

Again Mr• Carter came to its de-

tense.
"The frequently recurring panioa from. which
we have auf.feHd ••••• have been more destructive
than the ware in which we have engaged. The
financial disorders which have reaulted' from
pan1ca trom time to time have been born ot fear
and diatruat. The experience of the past in
this particular will be repeated in the future
until we provide some depository in which the
vast army ot wage earners and otm ra or small
means have absolute oont1dence •••• It follows,
therefore, that the postal savings system will
10.
11.

Outlook, (Aug. 28, 1909) Vol. 92, P• 965.

Thomas H. Carter, "Poatoffice as a Depository for Savings",
North American Review (Apr. 1910) Vol. 191. P• 450.

27.

be a powerful agency working most efficiently
to preserve the equilibrium in times of financial disturbance. Finally th1a system will
beget interest in and devotion to the Government.nl2
Despite the fact that some termed it "paternal1at1c 1 reckless and socialistic", the b1ll, after much consideration passed
the Senate by more than a two-thirds majority, and was sent on
13
to the House of Representatives.
When tinally accepted by this
body, it was sent to President William B. Taft, by whom it was
signed on June 25 l9lo. 14
1

In the examination of the United States Postal Sav1:pga

--

!!!!

and Its Amendmenta, only the sections pertinent to the general

theme of thie chapter, will be cited.

We find that it 1a,

"An Aet to establish postal savings depositories for depositing
savings at interest with the security of the government tor re15
payment thereof, and tor other purpoaesn.
Through its enactment there was created, a board of trustees which would control•
supervise, and administer the postal aav1nga depository offices
that had been designated and established under the provisions of
the aot.

It would in like manner take charge of the funds re-

ceived aa deposits.

The board was to consist of the Postmaster

General, the Secretary ot the Treasury, and the Attorney General,
12.
13.
14.
15.

Ibid., P• 455.
nut!ook, (Mar. 1910) Vol. 94, P• 594 ed.
Kemmerer, P• 2.

~¥!lft¥~e~Mai-t-fta~~·\\~~ tt\'!s5~. ~ai~tl•• (Gov•t

28.
acting~

officio, and-having power to make proper regulations to

receive, transmit, deposit, invest and repay the funds deposited
at postal savings depoa1tor1ea.

In Seo. 3. we find that the

board of trustees was authorized and empowered to state which
post offices should be postal savings depoa1tor1ea.

Every post

office ao designated was authorized and required to receive de•
posits of funds from. the public.

Each depoaitOl"J waa to account

for and dispose ot all funds, according to the provisiorus and
regulations

or

the Postal Savings Act.

Postal savings depository

tunds·were to be kept separate from other tunda.
and other officers and employees

or

Postmaster1,

the postal service, were to

be held accountable tor such funds as, "the faith

or

the United

States is solemnly pledged to the payment ot the depoaita made 1n
postal savings depository oft1oea with accrued interest thereon
as herein prov1ded ••• nl6
In keeping with this act, the tirst 1nst1tutiona of this
kind were opened tor business on January 3, 1911, at which
time one such bank waa opened in each state and territory.

When

the fiscal 1ear 1913 came to a close, 12,151 depoa1tor1es had
Thus it is that this type ot bank, designated
to absorb the depoa1ts or timid depositors, flourlahea today. 17

been established.

16. Ibid. PP• 814-19.
17. kemmerer, PP• 5~, 128.

29.

We ahall find that these depositories became more and more
popular as confidence in banking institutions failed. 18

On

February 28, 1933 deposits reached the billion dollar mark. 19
Because of this, opposition became ao bitter that the Seventy-

tbird Congress was urged to abolish postal savings banks.

This,

however, was not done, but it waa felt that the guaranty ot deposits provision in the Banking Act of 1933 would bring about a
reduction of deposits in the postal savings banks.20

18. Review of Reviews, (Feb. 1934) Vol. 90. p. 11. ed.
19. CJarle, P. 944.

20. Ibid., P• 947, see also The Bankers Ma,azine (The Bankers
Pub. Co., Cambridge, MasS:-(iay 1933) ol. I26, p. 421.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT
The financial d1tf1cult1ea accompanying the depreaaion ot
1907-08 were ao serious as to provide the final illustration and

arguments necessary to bring the Federal Reserve System into
existence.

As the act whioh brought this aystem into being waa

not passed until December 23, 1913, it 1• necessary tor ua to.
take notice of the intervening event and attempt• at legislation.
Senator Nelson

w.

Aldrich was, between 1907 snd 1912, the

acknowledged leader in the movement tor banking and currency reform.1

Aa chairman of the National Monetary Commission which haa

been created by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act or 1908, he began to
formulate remedial measures.

The Aldrich-Vreeland Act had pro-

vided for an emergency issue ot bank notes by groups or national
banks, a temporary measure, aiming to relieve the financial
stress until such time, that more suitable governmental legislation might be enacted.

In the meantime the National Monetary

Commission was to make a survey of banking conditions here and
abroad, and to compile a report which should serve as the basis

1. The Nation, (Aug. 1913) Vol. 97, P• 376.
2. ~L. Laughlin• The Federal Reserve Act Its Origin
lems, Macmillan "ffi>.', N. Y., 1§33) p.-r!.~
30.

~

f!:.22.•

31.

ot the anticipated legislation.

3

On Janua17 1-0, 1911, he presented to a group of Washington
bUSiness men, the first draft of that which was later to become
the basis of the Aldrich bill.

Thia draft, while only tentative,

bad as its outstanding feature the provision tor a central bank,
which was in keeping with the interests ot Wall Street. 4 After
the neoesearr revision, the report of the Commission and the plan

or bill were eent to Congress on January

a,

1912.

The bill never

received full d1acuss1on in either house ot Congress, because
the Monetary Oommisaion had been created during the Republican
administration and its bill 1tood no chance of becoming law
after the ehitt in power which came with the election ot Woodrow
Wilson in November 1912.5
President Wilson had made it clear both before and after hie
election that he intended to have a "real and direct" connection
with Congreaa1onal legislation.
was borne out by the exhibition

This determ1nat1ou, we shall see,

or

team work between the Presi-

dent and Congress in the passage of the Currency Bill or Federal
Reserve Act. 6
When the leading House Democrats were rather certain that
no action. would be taken on the Aldrich bill, they devoted
their time to political scheming.

3. Bradford, p. 327.

The House Banking Committee

4. Laughlin, P• 16.
5. Bradford, P• 329. See also Laughlin, P• 56.
6. The Nation, Vol. 97, P• 136.

32.

was divided, 1.e., halt to investigate the Money Trust, and the
other halt under the chairmanship of Charter Glass to take up the
~atter

of banking legislation.

It was this sub-committee under

Mr. Glass which formulated the currency bill which waa eventually
legislated as the Federal Reserve Act. 7
As Mr. Glass was not active in opposition to the plans to
investigate the Money Trust, he was left undisturbed in working
out a banking bill.

On January 30 1 1913 the first draft of his

bill went to President Wilson.

Having def1b1tely entered the

political stage, it was now to be subjected to the whims of the
political forces in Congress and other administrative influences.
The measure was taken up at the extra aeasion of Congress, April
1913, although it was
called.

not tor thia that the session had been

a

As the bill stood, there were .features which were bound to
provoke opposition, and 1t was evident that this oppoa1t1on would
center about the composition of the Federal Reserve Board.
Bankers became fearful that control

be given over to politicians, and dqubtlesa there was some basis tor this fear. 9
wo~ld

Such an opinion was expressed by Nathaniel French of the firm of
French and Hecht, Manufacturers, Davenport, Iowa, when he appeared before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee in

7. Lau.ghl1n, pp. l 00-1 Ol •
8. Ibid., P• 138.
9. IOia:., PP• 140-2.

33.

October, 1913.

Hi·s view was that tho Act 1 tself was a great re-

form and that good might be gained from its enactment, but he
teared the ayatem would drift into pol1t1oa.lO
To further bear this out, Laughlin cites Carter Glass's
Adventure In Constructive Finance, where
find, "•••the
-AnP1•esident
requested the House chairman, as compensation to
W3

bankers tor denial

or

representation on the central board, to set

up a Federal A4viao17 Council, to be composed exclua1vel7 ot
bankers, authorized to sit at times with the Federal Reserve
Board in a purely advisor,. capacity." 11

Bankers were not the only antagonists.

Secretary William

Jennings Bryan opposed 1t on the grounds that in some respects it
did not conform to Democratic history nor doctrine.

He maintained

that it waa the function or the Government and not the banks, to
issue money. 12 We find that at a later date Father Coughlin
maintained the aame idea.

One ot the sixteen points ot h1a

National Union tor Social Justice, calla tor a "central bank and
a nationalized banking aystem." 13

lo. Hearinls Before the Committee on Banki;t and Currenoz
u. s.enate, 63G'Ong. l. Seas:-Gov•t riiir. orr!ce. Wash.
Vol-;-3. p. 20'70.
.
ll. Carter Glass, An Adventure In Constructive Finance, (Doubleaa1 Page ana co;, darden Citj', I. Y., 1927) p. 116.
12. Laughlin, P• 154.
13. Literad" Disest, (Mar. 23, 1935) Vol. 119. P• 7. see also
Raymon Gram Swing, "Father Coughlin, The Wonder of Self
Discovery", ~Nation, (Dec. 26, 1934) PP• 731•3.
.

34.

Strange as it may·be, however, when the House radicals,
under the leadership of a Mr. Henry of Texas, who wished to curry
the favor of Mr. Bryan, expressed themselves with venom against
the bill, Mr. Bryan turned right about face and endorsed the
bill. 14 Another ambitious Cabinet member, who was antagonistic
to the Glass bill, was Secretary McAdoo.

Being spurred by per-

sonal aapirat1ons, he presented a bill which he claimed to be
euper1or to that of Mr. Glass.

His bill, he deemed a more prac-

tical one which met w1th the approval of many bankers, although
be cited only one specitically. 15
So, says Mr. Laughlin,

"Later the Glass bill, thus supported by the
President in spite ot cr1tic1am ot Mr. Bryan,
the revolt of Secretal"1 McAdoo, and the warfare ot the Aldrich group in New York, went to
the Houee Democratic Caucus for approval September 11, 1913 ••• After minor changes in the
cauoua, the fourth drart ••• as modified by the
Banking Committee, was reported to the House
•••• It was debated tor five day•• The main
objections urged to the measure were aa to
the powers granted the Federal Reserve Board,
the compulsory membership ot the national
banks and the transter of reserves. After an
amendment by Mr .. Fess that nothing in the bill
could be construed as a change in the gold
standard ••• the bill passed the House September
18, 1913 by a vote of 287--85. Thl'ee Democrats
voted against the bill, 48 Republicans tor 1t
and 82 against it."16
14. Laughlin, P• 159.
15. Ibid.
16. ?t;IQ'., PP• 159-61

-

During the period ot debate, Representative Hardwick, Democrat of Georgia, assailed the Party's finance plan, saying that
1t would "toeter banking monopol7 in which the government would
be a party."

He continued that in every- other branch

or

industry the Democratic party bad contended,
"Down with monopoliea, combines and trusts •••
and yet it aeems likely that in this bill ••••
we have eatabl1ahed a gigantic money trust,
with all the banks or the country- concentrated
in twelve great central banka, with the government linked between them and the government in
actual partnership, lending them money, 1aau1ng
them money •••• In this bill it appears that we
have abandoned the position taken b7 the Democratic party in the recent campaign, and have
gone over, bag and baggage, to the Roosevelt
(Theodore) position.•·• .Bear thia 1n mind: if the
bill becomes a law 7ou will have prosperity, expansion, more loans, more eredite, boom times tor
a while. The goose will bang high. But pay day
comes with a nation, as well as with an 1nd.1v1dual. "17
Representative Kahn, ot Cal1forn1a, stated that he was against the bill because Secretary of Stnte, Bry-an, was for it,
and added that an7 proposed legislation which Mr. Bryan approved
should be scrutinized carefully. 18
The bill was now sent to the Senate where changes were
suggested because of the influence ot New York banking 1nteres ta upon the Senate, and becauae there were within the
~mocrat1c·group,

varied v1ewpo1nta regarding banking policy

17. New York Tribune, Sept. 13, 1913.
18. !E'fd-;--

-

and on the provisions of the bill.

Only the "dominating force

of Mr. Wilson's leadership" made final action possible.
Joseph P. Tumulty 1 s, Woodrow Wilson!!!

!!!.2! .!.!!!!li is

19

In

a state-

ment to the effect that it is doubtful that many persona realize
the character ot the opposition which President Wilson met even

in the ranks of his own party.

Representative Glaaa bad informed

him that the stubborn opposition in the Committee, led by Demo-

cratic Senators 0 1 Gorman and Reed and Republican Senator Root,
might succeed in "killing the bill."

Secretary McAdoo had in-

formed him that opposition leaders in the Senate had planned a
filibuster and thus prevent passage of the bill.20 The opposition
was 1ntluent1al enough to bring about a party break in the
Senate. 21
"Quiet tips" were given to balky Senators, to visit the
White House.

It was understood that the President's patience

------

had been exhausted, for the New York Tribune, ot September 27,
1913 stated,

"He tears that unleae he wields the master'•
rod the opposition to the currency bill will
assume dangerous proport1ows, aa ••• 1ntluences
are at work to upaet the adm1n1atrat1on•a pro•
gramme •• Patronage is the rod which the President
will undoubtedly use on the trio whom he believes
are liable to cauae the most disturbance.•22
19. Laughlin, P• 169.
20. Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him, (Doubleday,
Page and oo.) (Garden City, N, Y., -ygm_rpp. -n'6-89.
21. Henry J. Ford, Woodrow Wilson, The Man and His Work, (D.
Appleton and Co., 'I. Y. 191~Y p~oe.- 22 • .!!.! York Tribune, Sept. 27 1 1913.

r
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Senator Hitchcock would not change hia attitude because he
telt that he had nothing to lose through hie defiance of the
president, since Secretary Bryan controlled the patronage in
Nebraska, and since be himself had been elected to Congress by
both Republican and Democratic views.

From the first he bad made

1t clear that be was not in accord with President W1laon•a cur-

rency v1ewa. 23
There were many persons who requested hearings betore the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee regarding the adm1n1atrat1on• s bill, ao, further action was delayed to permit these hearings.

Among those heard were: bankers; business men who bad ex-

perienced hardship in 1907, in obtaining currency trom the banks
even though they had plenty of collateral; and members of
Chambers of Commerce.

Th.ere were individuals aa: R.

c.,

Monetary Statiat Bond Bldg. Wash. D.
advantages ot the bill; Jer1m1ah

w.

c.

Milliken,

who spoke on defects and

Jenke, Prof. ot Government,

New York Un1vera1't7 1 who thought the bill good and, that it would
decidedly improve the ex1at1ng defective banking system; Victor
Moraweta, a New York lawyer who specialized in corporation and
banking law, and who considered the bill detective; and B. Parker
Willia, Prof. or Economioa and writer of financial art1olea, who
was expert advisor to the House Banking and Currency Committee

-----

23. New York Tribune, Sept. 30 1 1913.
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under Carter Glaas•s chairmanship. 24
When the Senate finally passed the bill 54--34, on December
19, 1913, with three Republicans voting for it, its form had changed from that upon which the House had passed.

Thia

sending both bills to a oon.t'erence ot the two Houses.
ference was composed

or

nine Senate conferees and

necessitate~

The con-

Representative~

Glass, Korbley ot Indiana, and Hayes ot California.

When

favorable action was secured, the bill was signed by President
Wilaon on December 23, 1913.

25

Thus tar this was the most im-

portant piece ot legislation ot the Wilson administration.
problem, now, was to get the new law into operation. 26

The

The Act as approved waa, "An Act to provide tor tbe eatabllshment of Federal reserve banks, to turniah an elastic currency, to
attord means ot red1acount1ng commercial

pape~,

to establish a

more effective supervision or banking in the United States, and
tor other purposes.•27 Section 10 spec1t1ed the qual1f1cat1ona
of members of the Federal Reserve Board.

This board consists ot

seven members appointed by the President with the advice and
consent

or

1935, the terms

25.
26.
27.
28.

or

or

the Banking Act ot
the appointees were changed. 28

the Senate.

After the anactment

Hearings Before the Committee on Banlc1§§ and Currency u. s.
Senate 63 Co~. l.sesa. Vol. !':" PP• 13-2522.
New York Trlline, Dec. 21, 1913 and Dec. 23, 1913. See also
ti\ignI!ii, P• 169.
Outlook, (Mar. 7, l914)Vol. 106. P• 527.
Federal Reserve Act, Gov•t Print. Office, Wash. 1935. P• l.
ll'ederal Reserve Act, P• 35.

The appointment of the Reserve Board showed evidence ot the
1 poils

system, tor, of the five appointed to serve with the

secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency,
some knew little of banking, but they did represent some interest
group, 1.e., labor or tarmer. 29 In April, this committee announced the twelve reserve cities, provided tor in the Act, as
being Boston, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Richmond, Kansas
City, Atlanta, St. Louis; M1nneapol1a 1 Dallas, Texas, Cleveland,
and San Francisco.

They gave as the basis ot their aelectiona,

" •••• the ability of banka 1n a given d1atr1ct to subscribe the
necessary capital for their regional. bankJ the mercantile·, industrial and financial connections existing in each district; and
the probable usefulness ot a regional bank to serve a district •••
their general geographic situation, the population, area and
prevalent business act1v1t1ea of the diatrict." 30
Being

or

the opinion that there was widespread ignorance

among the voters

or

the country as to the dangers

financial system; Edwin

w.

Kemmerer in hia

Reserve System, states,

29. Laughlin, P• 142.
30. !!!!, Nation, Vol. 98, P• 383.

A.B.c

or

the country•a

~ ~

Federal
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"In 1912 the United States had many times
more commercial banka than any other country
in the world ••• The great majority ot national
banks were national in nothing but name. In
1907 our supply or reserve money was large.
We had at that time in the United States the
largest supply of gold 1n the world. It waa
inettective, however, because it waa widely
aoatteredJ hence euspene1on ot cash payments
throughout the country, currency premium., the
breakdown ot our domestic exchanges, the illegal issue ot million• or dollars ot mon97
substitutes, and all other disgraceful accom•
panments or the old time American panic ••••
These then were the three moat serious phaaea
or our banking decentral1&$.t1ona (l) Absence
or a responsible national conaervator ot the
money market, like the Bank ot France or the
Bank ot England. (2) Scattered bank reserves.
(3) Immobile bank reservea.•~I
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System
thousands of banks held their own gold reserves. blit after ita
establishment, member banks turned their gold reserves over to
the control of the Federal Reserve Bank• and under the control or
the Federal Reserve Board a •vast central pool or credit" we.a
created.32
Great credit goes to President Wilaon, who, though not a
financier, realized the need for and the importance of the reform
made possible by the Federal Reserve Act, which was the moat
notable achievement ot his first term as Preaident.33

Ria

31. Edwin w. Xemmerer, The A·B•C ot the Federal Reserve Syatem1
Princeton Univ. Preii":" !928. pretaoe.
32. Congressional Record, 71 Cong. 3. Seas., 1931. 6886.
33. Edvard R. Liwis, X. H1sto1l or Aliierloan Political Tho~t
From the Civil War to the orid War, lacm111an Co., N. · •

rm.p.

35S. -

-

-

-
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patience and persistence are commendable, for without these
attributes, he could not, in the face of such bitter opposition
)lave engineered the passage of the bill.

34

Credit likewise must

be given the Monetary Commission, tor even though their project
failed, they aroused public opinion to the extent that the financial world at least waa more open-minded when the Glaaa-Owen Bill
was to be considered.

More credit la due Representative Glass ot

Virginia, and senator Owen ot Oklahoma, the aponeora of the bill
in their respective Houses of Congress.
The attitude ot the bankers only served to cryatalize public
opinion.

When bankers tought the bill because it denied private

control, the public looked upon it with favor.
exceptions in the banking group.

True, there were

Senator Weeks of Massachusetts

was such.

Although a Republican and a banker, he advocated the
bill and voted for 1t. 3 5
Whether the bill served the purpose tor which it was
designed, remains to be aaoerta1ned.

We shall have evel'J' oppor-

tun1 t1 to do ao when we are confronted with the conditions which
accompany the depreaeion of 1929•33.

William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson the Man Bia limes and
His Work, (Houghton Mittlln co., IJOeton,'""'!0'2ijpp §94-5:--see
aiao"""!iiirr Jones Ford, PP• 200-0SJ Joseph P. Tumulty, PP• 466•
489; H. Wilson Barria, President Wilson Ria Problems and His
Pol107, Head1'y Bros. Lta., tondon, 19!,.r-pp. 1o5-o7.--- --35. Cfu£1ook, Vol. 106. P• 2.

CHAPTER V.
THE DEPRESSION OF 1929·-----------The Stock Market crash ot October
1929--Eventa leading to the craah-Ettect upon the nation--The Reaonatruction Finance Oorporation·-GlaaaSteagall Act, pro and con••Approved
by President Hoover.

CHAPTER V.
THE DEPRESSION OF 1929
It was pointed out bJ Frederic A. Delano, in the December
1932 Review !l.! Rev1ewa 1 that

put

pan1ca have been the result ot

overspending or as one might

•&7•

the result ot "speculating on

prospective protita."

The panic ot 1929 had a similar origin.

For eight years, tollowing the war,
ti ve.

~

had been 1nduatr1ally ao•

W1 th increasing prot1 ta,.., peopl.,.# who were ordinarily oon-

aervat1 ve, lost their sense ot perspect1v'1f despite the faot,..
that sensible peraone should have known the upward swing could not
Qontinue 1nde.f1n1tel7 • 1

It was the English viewpoint tha~ not

only was speculation rampant, but, aa one writer tersely put it,
"purchases of cara, radio sets, gramophones, furniture, and even
clothing and holida1s on the 1natallm.ent ayatem bad become exoeaa1v••"

2

Still another Britisher compared the body politic with

the human bodJ•

He conveyed the idea that just aa a maJa::V att&oka

each ot us 1n our weakest place, so 1t waa that the attack upon
our "top-heavy structure ot speculation" in 1929 was 1nev1table. 3
l. Frederic A. Delano, "Our recent Cr1a1a and the Future",Review

of Reviews, Review of Reviewa Corporation, N.Y., (Dec. 1932)
Vol. 86. P• 27.
2. The Tablet, The Tablet Office, London, (Nov. 2 1 1929) Vol. 154

~.

P:-570.

NOrm.an Crump, "The American Banking Crisis", The Nineteenth

Centuif and After, Constable and co. Ltd., London, (Jan. 1933)
Vo!. z-;-p. 4o7.
42.

The United States, according to his view, waa not a completely
developed nor a completely settled country.

Thus, there waa

great possibility for speculation in real estate.

Under pressure

many bankers granted loana against real estate as collateral.
so, he said, "thus when the or1a1s came the vast majority of
bankers had one foot deeply buried in the stock market and the
other in the fortunes •••• ot their particular localities." 4
When the World War began, the United States waa a debtor
nation, but when 1t ended she was a creditor.

Aa such, she had

entered a moat remarkable speculative era, one, "which dwarfed
all others, not only in duration, but also in volume and aoope.•
Having amaaaed nearly one•half of the monetal'J' gold of the world,
she was in no way subjected to the trying economic adjustments
suffered by the European Nations, while effecting some aemblenoe

ot atab111ty.5
The disorganized trade and induatl'J' ot those nations served
to further and favorably stimulate those ot the United States.
Her profits 1nereaaed year by year, until they aurpaaaed all
previous ones.

This, then, served to accelerate the speculative

movement on the New York Stock Exchange, a speculative frenzy
which waa carried too tar, tor the gambling fever had gripped
all classes

or

the populace.

The Federal Reserve Board felt

4. The Nineteenth Cent!!ff and After, Vol. 113. P• 412.
5. lffii Liv!~ lii, 'l'he
ving Age Co., N.Y., (Dec. 1929) Vol.337
P:-3~4. ~e""&rao Bernhard Ostrolenk, 9 Why the Banka Collapsed~
Current History;, N. Y. Times Co.,N.Y., (May 1933) Vol.38.p.152

44.
that in some way the fever must be checked, but it teared incurring disfavor of the public, i t it took any drastic steps.

so, tor political reasons, it was content merely to issue warnings.

6

Aoeor-dl:ng;.o... war-butt4s- the Federal Reserve Board published a
1 tatement

on February 7, 1929, warning the people ot the dangers

involved in the use ot the credit supply ot the nation tor apeculati ve purpoaes. 7 On April 12, 1929 another warning waa ieaued
with the result that "the diac1ples ot the gospel ot the new era
were ••• reeenttul ot the meddling eight men at Waahington ••• •8
There were others, however, who relt that the Board had not
meddled enough. But, Warburg•s opinion was that though credit
ahould be given the Board tor its warninga, the Board should have
gone farther and "should have driven the people ashore before the
ice broke.• 9
In Joseph Stagg Lawrence, Wall

~·

.!!'!..'! Washiggton, is a

atatement that the Board was requested to give to the Senate an7
information and suggestions that it felt would correct the evil
•h!ch the Federal Reserve Board had mentioned in press dispatches that, •money is being drawn

t~om

the channels of bulJ1-

nese and used tor speculative purposes and eome ot said
6. The Living A~o' Vol. 377. PP• 394-5.
7. Warburg, P•
6. See also Thomae B. Gammock, "Scolding b7 the
· Federal Reserve," OUtlook, (Feb. 20 1 1929)Vol.l51.p. 306Jirv1ng
. F1sher,The Stock Mariit Craah and After, (Macmillan Co. 1930},

l

~

p. 265.--:·1 Warburg! P• 508.
191~. I t>l~e

---

45.
1 peculation

is illegitimate and harmtuJ. ••• nlO

During the wave ot pseudo prosperity, bank deposits contin·
ued to increase, and bankers soon became cognizant or the fact
that they could become the cuatodiana ot immense sum.a, simply by
offering higher interest rates for time deposits.
"In theory, time deposits were investments rather
than oommero1al tunda, beoauae the7 were not active
accounts and were not expected to be withdrawn
readily. In practice, however, time depoeita 1n com•
merc!al bank1 differed little from demand deposits,
because banks, instead or ina1at1ng upon any period
ot notice tor withdrawals, paid the deposits upon
demand.nll
So it was that trom 1921 to 1929 the commercial banks bad a con-

stant supply

or

tunda for investment purposes.

Banks then became
involved in the "issue- purchase, sale and holding or stocka.• 12

The large New York banka opened or created special security at•

filiatea for this purpose.13

The Reserve Banka 1 too; were not

without guilt, tor they, indirectly, through making money easily
obtainable, ~ad aided apeculat1on. 1 ' The result was that the
Federal Reserve Board was soon compelled to interfere, to prevent
auoh uae of capital which was intended tor the use ot industry.
Bueineaa men, bankera and government otf1o1ala aided with the

10. Joseph Stagg Lawrence, Wall St. and Washington, (Princeton
Univ. Presa. 1929) PP• ~2;-"'46!=!.
ll. Current Hiatorz, Vol. 38 P• 153.
12. The Nineteenth Centurz and After, Vol. 113. P• 411.
13. 'Clirrent HlatoRl, Vol. 3~p. 153.
14. The NineEient centurr ~ After, Vol. 113, P• 412.
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soard's views regarding the existing danger. 15

Warnings were not heeded and the general speculative move~ent

was suddenly climaxed by the crash

October, 1929.

or

the stock market in

Ordinary people were not the only surprised onts,

tor even the moat influential economists had l>ein -of the

~pinion

that America was on the -M gh road to plent)-, and that poverty had
0

been conquered.

In

~

Spectator, Mr.

s.

K. Ratcliffe·, a

Britisher, speaks ot President Hoover as being the head of this
school

or

thought.

Therefore, in keeping with this doctrine, the

President was persistent in h1a atatementa that an upward turn
would soon come. 16
Then began the incomparable period of depression, which waa
to affect the industrial, commercial, and agricultural life ot
the nation.

With this was to come the usual bank failures,

restricted currency, and non-payment, plus the added factors ot
general alarm and lack ot assurance. 17
We shall pause here to consider the crash and 1ts effect

upon the nation.

------

Said The New York Times, "Amid scenes ot wild

confusion and drastically lower prices, the stock market continued yesterday to pay the piper tor its long dance •••• n 18
15. Alexander D. Noyes, "The stock Market Panic," Current Bisto17,
(Dec. 1929) Vol. 31, P• 619. See also Warburg, P•
16. S.K. Ratcliffe, nHow America Sees Berselt,n The Spectator,
(May 28, 1932) Vol. 148. P• 754.
~
17. Bruce, American Parties and Politics, PP• 172-3
18. The New York Times, Oct.~, 1929.

Sos.

-------
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Brokers, resembling a disheveled mob, exhausted both mentally and
phya1oally, with unoertain steps reached their offices at the
close or "one ot the most nerve wracking days in the hietorr ot
the present speculative generation." 19
Thousands ot stockholders threw their shares on the market
in an attempt to salvage what they could• thereby' causing a great
decline in stock prices.

20

The toundationa of the market were

shaken, tor never had Wall Street been eo unexpectedly forced to
liquidate such large brokerage ac~ounta.21

In Ohicago•s market, too, a wave
by crowd impul••• 22

or

liquidation waa created

Chicago and Wew York bankers went to the

rescue of their customers, by turn1sh1ng millions of dollar• to
break the downward course ot the market.

In the Chicyo Daily

Tribune, a newa item by William Shinnick atatea,
· "Chicagoans took their losae·s in yesterday' a
stock market battle like soldiera •••• There waa
none of the loud moaning or weeping that are
sometimes assumed to go with financial criaea.
At least i t there was any, it was done 1n places
where the world couldn't hear. But the tension
was there ••• The i•neral attitude was one ot
bewilderm.ent •••• n23

There was an unusual amount or excitement around the bro•
kerage houaes in London.

19. Chicaso
20. The New

Thay remained open after the regular

~a1~:r

or

Tribune, Oct. 22, 1929.
Times, Oct. 24, 1929. Also New York Herald

'l'rI'bune,~. 24, 1929.
21. London Tim••• Oct. 25, 1929
22. !he Cliic~o Da~lI .!!!!.• Oot. 24, 1929.
23. CE!'cyo
llz r bune, Oct. 25, 1929.
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closing hour, even though they expressed the view that they did
not fear a money tieup, such as accompanied the panics of 1893
24
and 1907.

In Berlin, it seemed that the break in the New York market
was expected; and the French journals, weekly and semi•monthly,

as well as the daily press, gave their explanations
Wall Street criaia.

or

the various

So it waa appropriately said, "The elegant

Par1e1an ladJ', the English working man, the German bourgeois are

all interested for various reaaona 1n a financial crash aome
three thousand miles awa7 ••••• 25
There came demands trom. Senatore at Washington, tor an in•
veatigation, not only ot Wall Street and the factors contributing

to the crash, but ot the Federal Reserve System. aa well. 26 On
Saturday October 26, 1929 1 President Herbert Hoover issued a reassuring statement, saying that business was sound; that leading
bankers and 1ndustr1al1ata claimed the country was tinanoially
soundJ and that

~steria

seemed momentarily to have passed.

27

On the preceding day, at Washington. lobby investigations,
the naval conference, and the taritf question were all put aside,

24. Ibid.·

25. tril"n~ Agi, Vol. 337, P• 509.Also !!!!. Ch1C!i$0 Daill !!.!!!.·
l5ot. 5, 929.
26. New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1929.
27. '5i wew-York !lmea, Oct. 26, 1929. Also Chicago Herald
!xamlner-;-<rCt. 26, 1929.

10

that the drama ot Wall Street and 1ta country wide repercus-

sions might be observed.

Periodicall7, Andrew Mellon, Secretary

of the Treasury-, kept in touch b7 telegraph, with Wall Street Senator Carter Glaaa, form.er Secretary of the Treasury, blamed
"M1tchell1am" and improper administration
system tor the debacle.

or

the

Feder~l Reaerv~

"K1tohell1am" was hia way of referring

to the influence ot Charles E. Mitchell, chairman of the National
City Bank of Rew York.

28

Bia th•o1'1 waa that speculation enriches

the speculator and thereby enr1chea the 1nduatr1al1at, and as it

creates wealth it is a social benet1t, tor with this wealth comea
the ability to acquire cars, homea, and personal adornment. 29
Then came criticism.a trom other Senators, who estimated that
Federal Reserve funds had been ueed in the speculative marlmt. 30
Representative Louis McFadden, chairman ot the House Committee on
Banking and CUrrenoy 1 claimed that the Wall Street decline waa due
to the Federal Reserve policy ot withdrawing gold to aid in

Europe•s rehabilitation. 31
Blam.1ng President Hoover and Secret&l"J' ot the Treasury

Mellon, Senator Joseph
m1nor1t7 leader

or

'l.

Robinson, Democrat ot Arkansas,- and

the Senate, made the statement,

28. New York Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1929.

29. l!'im.ard Pq,

Roosevelt and Ria America, (Little Brown and Co.

Boston, 19~. P. 137.

~~:

-

-

·

!gf4:ork Herald Tribune, Oct. 25, 1929.

50.

"While prices of stocks were soaring when
speculation was at its height, no one in
authority stood in the way or res1ated
the movement--a movement which clearly toreshadowed di1aater ••• It may be well to trace
the beginning of thi• calamity ••• Rad the
Democratic party been 1n power when the
stampede on the stock exchange occurred,
the ruinous results would have been charged,
by Republican leaders, to the t1Dlllo1al
polioiea ot the ad.m1n1atrat1on.•32
Returning to the scene ot action, Wall Street, there
thronged those who wiah to tell everyone ot their loaaea; but no
one wished to hear.

They were only a part ot the great multitude

of American citizens

or

every class ot society, who had con-

sidered it smart to ait around brokerage ottioes on the trail ot
"easy money".

To them this had been preferable to the moderate

earnings gained from physical labor. 33

In England tbe opinion was expressed that America should wel•
come this check to her speculative mania, and a chance to return
to normal.

True, there had been maJlT criaea in England, but
'

never a pure gamblini criaia ot the magnitude ot that which
34
'
gripped America.
With the atock market crash, oame a period ot depreaeion,
during which time, some

or

the larger cit7 ban.kB, aa well ae
man7 amaller country 1nat1tut1ona, failed. 35 First to cloee its
doors, in December 1930 was the Bank of the United States, in
Chicago

~ai'y

Tribune, Oct. 31, 1929.

!he New or Times, 5ct. 30, 1929.
tri'i~~e, Vol. 337 1 P• 395.
~radtor , P• 432.
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1e• York City.

Inveat1$Ation dlaolosed that traud and mia-

Jll8llagement had brought about its failure.

Public confidence was
!

_"

,!

shaken, and the wave or deposit withdrawals ga-tb.ere-4---imp&tus.
36
501 in 1931, 2298 bank suspensions were recorded.

As

stated prev1ouely, it became known that the Federal Re-

serve funds had been used to a great extent, in the promotion or
speculation, even though such use was contrary to law. 37 In

John M. Dagier'e article, "The Challenge to the Banke," World's

-

work, Oct. 1931, we find that President Hoover felt that the
Federal Reserve System had not been autt1o1ent to prevent the

wrongful uae of capital and bank depoaita.38

But, said Mr.

Carter Glass, chairman ot the Senate probe conm.tittee, "It took
the disaster ot 1907 to get us the Federal Reserve banking
system; the disaster ot 1928·29
improvement of the s1atem.

tt

ough~

to get us somewhere in

89

The first attempt to relieve the tense situation was the
organization ot the National Credit

Corporat1o~in

October 1931.

According to President Hoover's suggestion, the banks in each
Federal Reserve district formed aasoo1ationsJ and each ot these
established a loan committee.

Then, it a bank needed tunde, it

applied to its group committee which approved and granted th•
36. Bradford, P• 449.

37. North American Review, Vol. 229, P• 174.
38. 3ohri M. ~a61er, Rfbe Challenge to the Banke",
(Oct. 1931) Vol. 60, P• 41.
39. Ibid, P• 43.

-

World's~'
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loan, if the collateral presented was aatiatactol'J".40 Thia corporation did not prove to be the success that had been antlo1pated, and it was tollowed by the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-

tion Act ot Janual'J" 22, 1932, which provided tor an organization
to relieve diatreaaed banka, busineaa, agriculture and railroads.
It began operations on February 2 1 1932 with a capital ot
$5 1 000 1 000 1 000

subscribed by, the. United States Treasury.

Through its aid, the number of bank failures decreased in March
1932 to the lowest figure since October 1929.

41

Congress had stipulated that the corporation waa to be a
bipartisan agency, to whose board not more than four members ot
the seven appointed, oould be ot one political party.

The board,

as originated, consisted ot tour Republicans and three Demoorata.
The original members were: Andrew Mellon, Secretary

or

the

Treasur,, who waa soon succeeded. by) Ogden M1llaJ Eugene Meyer,
governor of the Federal Reserve BoardJ Paul Bestor·, Farm Loan
Comm1as1onerJ and General Charles G. Dawes, Republicans.

The

Democrats were: Harvey Couch, of AlabamaJ Wilson MoCartbT, ot
Utah; and Jesse He Jones.

Upon request of President Hoover,

Mr. John Nance Garner, the speaker of the House of Representatives;
Senator Jospeh T. Robinson, the minority leader in the Senate;
40. Bradford, P• 451.
41. Bradford, P• 451.

and Senator Carter Glass, submitted names rrom which the Demo.

cratic members or the board were chosen.

42

The policies or the corporation were largel7 determined b7'
43
President Hoover.
With the creation or the R. F. c. it was
stipulated that quarterl7 reports were to be made to Congresb re•
garding the total amount lent the various class•• ot borrowera.
It waa not required that the names or the borrowers, nor the

amount lent to each, be made public.

Thia brought forth the

accusation that certain 1ntereata could be favored.

Therefore

the law was amended, requiring a report, showing the names

or

the

borrowers, the amount borrowed, and the rate ot interest obarged,
to be aent monthly to the Prea!dent; Senate and House of Repreaentativee. 44

It waa teared, however, that goaaipera might

spread 1ntorm.at1on aa to who the borrowers were, and therebJ make
deposit·ore distrustful of those 1nstitut1ona.

Such would be

disastrous in view of the taot that there was alread'J' too much
hoarding and conaequent bank failures. 45 Already the hoarding
movement had brought forth an appeal t:rom the Preaident that aa a
•patriotic move toward loosening credit and restoring economic
stabilityn hoarding should oeaae.

In such a way, all citizens

might a1d the war against dep:reaaion. 46
42. Jesse H. Jonea, "Billions Out and Billions Back" The Satur1171v:z:1~ !2!!• The Curtis Pub. co. ,Ph1ladelphla-;-('"J\Dil 12,

!.2.!!.1 (June 12, 1937) P• 7.
44. lbl'd., P• 38.
45. Tbra., P• 40.
46. The New York Times, Feb. 4 1 1932.
43. The Saturd.az: ~veniB13
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Mostot us are aware, however, that during a depreas1on,
people almost always tear that the bank which holds their aavinga
may not be aolvent; and as Paul Douglas said 1n Collapse .2£ Cycle,
"they feel happier with their mone11n their pockets." 47 It anJ
confidence had remained, it waa soon lost when disclosures were
made regarding the unwise practices ot man1 prominent bankers.
Meanwhile, there waa in the making a credit expansion bill,
which was to become known as the Glaaa-Steagall Bill.

On

February 1 1 1932, Senator Glaaa told the Senate that bank.era were
propagandizing againat his bill, juat as they had. when the
Federal Reserve legislation had been proposed years before.

Some

persons who admitted a lack ot knowledge aa to lta contents and
purposes, were, at their bankers' requests, sending telegrams to
their Senators; asking them to oppose the bill.

It was even

predicted bT a Republican Senator that the section which would
restrict the loans of the Federal Reserve banka tor speculative
purposes, would not be cona1dered.'8
There were favorable reports on the Glass-Steagall bill in
the Banking Committees of both Senate and House.

Since the bill

was designed to "gear the machiner,y of the Federal Reserve
system tor greater service to the nation during the buaineae

47. Paul H. Douglas, Collapse .2!:. gzcle, (Lakeside Preas. Chicago,
Ill., 1933) Pt 8.
48. The New York Times, Feb. 2, 1932.

------
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emergenc7", the committees made alight amendments which would
make it possible tor the smaller tinano1al 1nat1tut1ona ot the
country to receive aid from the central banking ayatem.'9

About

this time, Secretary of the Treasury, Ogden Milla, atated,
bas been a ver1 real fear that haa
gripped the people ot the United States,

"~here

and it haa necessarily had a paralyzing 1ntluence on the credit machinery of the
country--the tear on the part ot those dee1r1ng credit that they might not be able
to get itJ the rear or thoae in debt that
their loans might be calledJ the tear ot
the great credit claaa known aa depositors,
that they might not in all cases be able to
withdraw their depoaita, and ••• the fear of
the bankers who are the trustees tor the deposi tora that under these outside pressures
their institutions might be threatened.•5 0
Senator Glass was to present the bill to the Senate on

Monday, whereas Representative Steagall, its co-author, was to do
likewise. in the House.

Because of the nature and purpose ot the

measure, the House put aside all other business and, after a
three hour debate, passed the bill with a vote of 350 to 15.
Even though there had been charges ot •gag rule and no time to
study the bill", many ot 1ta cr1tica had voted in favor of it. 51
When he introduced hia bill, Mr. Steagall said of its pro-

Tjm;b'
u. s.

49. The New York
Feb. 3, 1932.
e Committees on Banking and Currenu~
50. Bei'r!iiis"Be?ore
House of Regreseiititlves, 72 Cong. I. Seaa:-On R.R. ~03
(Feb. ~. 1 32)
Gov•t. Print. Ottioe, Wash., 1932, P• 20.
51. The New York Times, Feb. 16, 1932.

---
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visions,
"These are not cure-alls •••• but I do believe they
will extend the service of the Federal Reserve
System and bring that great agency into the tull
par~ it waa intended from the start to take in the
credit machinery and banking system of this countr,..
Our banking ayatem baa drifted into unhappy days.
Some ot us for years have warned the country ot what
was taking place and have pleaded with those in
power to change the policies under which we were
operating. Now a much larger task oonfronta us aa a
reault of the vicious practices which apparently
were condoned bi 8§<>•• ~espona1ble for the Federal
Reserve System. .
In the Senate, the bill was not takea up until the following
day.

It was then that Senator Glass spoke in its defense.

He

emphasized the fact that the purpose ot the bill was to "make

credit reaevoira ot the Federal Reserve System more accessible to
small banks"•

It was pointed out that banks, in groups ot five,

could pool their time or demand prom1aaory notea, provided they
\were backed by adequate secur1 ty, and then borrow directly from
the Reserve banka. 53 In detenae of the Federal Reserve System
itself, Senator Glaaa ea1d that there had been 1nnuendoea that
the Federal Reserve System had broken down.
considered untrue.

These charges he

If there were a breakdown 1t was not in the

system, but in the banking comm.unity of the United States, where
member banks of the Federal Reserve had ceased to tunotion. 54

52. The New York Times, Feb. 16, 1932.

53. nird:- -

-------

54. '1ii""New York Times. Feb. 17 1 1932.
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It became known that the bank• wh1oh were members ot the
pederal Reserve in New York, telt his accusation unjust.

They

said nothing in retutat1on of th1a statement, however, tor the7

were anxious that the bill be paaaed. 55
At still another time, when Senator Sh!pstead, ot Minnesota, expressed doubt ot the bill's passage, in face ot bankers'
opposition, Senator Glass stated that he was unwilling to even
think that the congress ot the United States would let certain

ot the Qount17ta bankers draft legislation for 1t.56
Connally

or

Senator

Texas let it be known that he hoped there would be

no further dela7 in paaaing the bill which would give the country, •this real piece ot legislation•; wl:d.oh was to hie mind the
onl7 "hopeful light• in all that ~d been considered b7 the
Senate at that aeaaion. 57 So, with but little oppoa1t1on, the
bill was passed in the Senate.

Naught was needed now but the

President's signature. and that waa expected to be obtained soon
therearter. 58
The Glass-Steagall Bill was next aent to President Hoover.
With the affixing of his signature, it became a law on Februarr
27, 1932. 59

55..

56.
57.

Ibid·.

Congressional Record, 72 Cong. l, Seaa. Vol. 75, part 4.

Ibid. 1 P• 4330.

58. Tlii"llew York Times, Feb. 20, 1932.
59. ~be Peaeral Reserve Bulletin, (Mar. 1932) P• 141. Also
Bradford, P• 343.

se.
With the enactment ot this amendment to the Federal Reserve
Aet, it was hoped, once more, tbat a panacea tor the banking ill•
For the time being we will leave

ot the nation had been round.
that as a matter ot conjecture.

Strange aa it ma7 seem, there

!!:! ~Times,

ot March 20, 1932, an article

appeared in !2!,

stating that three weeks had passed since the signing or the

b11~

during which time, it was ascertained trom the weekly reports ot
the Federal Reserve System, that none ot the privileges, which
might be gained from its enactment, had 7et been exercised.

Nevertheless, the measure must have had some psychological value,
for there was a drop in the number ot bank failures and a

reato~a

t1on of confidence, through the mere knowledge ot the tact, that
the banks could obtain aid i t such were needed. 60
Taking a hurried glance at the foregoing, before passing on

to our neat event1 the 7ear 1929 had a good start.

prosperit7 were ever;ywhere.

Signas of

Induetry we.a at its peak.

Luxuriee

were, to a given extent, enjo7ed by moat of the vast population.
Bank deposits were mounting and apeoulation waa rampant.

With-

out a warning the bubble burst, when on October 19, 1929, the

or

the Wall Street market sent a tremor ot uneasiness .over the count~. 61

disastrous crash

so.

61.

The New York Ti.mes, Mar. 20, 1932.
Bernir! fa7• looaevelt ~ !!!!. A.zmrica, P• 94.

59.

To use the word.a

or

Mr. Roosevelt, in his acceptance speech

of July 2, 1932, when he spoke ot the aftermath ot the great expansion and "delirious speculation" which had gone on before the
crash, "men lost their jobs ••• banka became frightened and started
calling loans •• ~Thoae who had money were atra1d to part with
it.n62

Then came the usual reaction:

dwi~dling

confidence 1n banks; .

withdrawalsJ hoarding; remedial legislation to coax ourrenc1
rrom hiding, to restore faith in banking 1nst1tut1ona, and it
possible avert further disaster.

So we found the enactment

or

the Glass-Steagall Bill which it wa• hoped would make more satis•
factory the .t'unctiona of the Federal Reserve System, which 1taelt
was the outcome ot legislation intended to avert a recurrence
oondi~lons,

62.

such aa were experienced 1n 1907.

Cone;r:essional Digest, (Aug.-Sept. 1932) Vol. 11, P• 209.

or

CHAPTER VI.
INSTABILiff OP BABKIBG-·--·--------··-S1gna ot weakening••Peartul depoa1tora-·
Bank runa and oollapaea--Emergeno7 Bank•
1ng Lawa and President P.D.Rooaevelt,
1933•-The new Glaaa•Steagall Bill or the
Banking Act ot 1938.

CHAPTER VI.
INSTABILIT!' OF BANKING
Albert Shaw, editor ot Review

~

Rev1ews 1 once made the

statement, th.at much ot the woe and m1ae17 experienced in the
United Statea, from its beginning to the present day, bad been
due to banka.

.Most countries; regardless of their a1ze, he

claimed; had some aort ot banking ayatem: but the United Statea
had "just banka and more bank•"•l

He went on to aq that due to

the lack ot uniformity 1n the banking lawa ot the various States,

supervision or inspection; in many instances, was ve'l"f lax.

The

breath-taking activities ot certain banketta in Wall Street had
been emulated in aouthern and western o1t1ea, but onl7 on a

lesser· scale•

2

When the year 1933 opened, we found Oongresa 1n a contused
state.

It seemed that no one had power.

Lippmann gives ua the

impression that.President Hoover apparently had no influence upon

the Congresa1onal boc.11'; and President-elect Roosevelt, aa yet had
no authority.
by

3

Bernard F&'I leavea a •lightly d1tterent 1mpreaaion,

intimating that it wae evident that on the ev-e of hi• retire-

ment Preeident Hoover was unwilling to assume respona1bil1t1ea
l. Review ot Reviews and World Work, (Jan. 1934) Vol.90, P• 46.ed.
2.

fo1a.· -

-

-

3. Walter Lippmann, Interpretation• 1933-1935, Macmillan co.,
B.Y., 1936, PP• 1-5.
eo. --- ----
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which might hamper the new executiveJ and the latter felt unwilling to offer support until legall7 entitled to do ao. 4
In January there had been 237 bank suapenaions, but the
seriousness or the situation had not become apparent until February 14, 1933.

On that date, William Comstock, Governor ot

Michigan, declared a week's bank holida7 in that State which waa
one or the largest and moat industrial States or the Union.
Because of d1rf1culties which had ariaen in the city' or Detroit,
the banking situation was so precarious, that the Governor, to
avert too great disaster, had ordered the banks cloaed. 5
The moratorium, aside trom disturbing depositors to a great
degree, drained cash from surrounding areas.

Large Detroit cor-

porations withdrew

the!~

deposits from New York as well as from

adjoining States.

These withdrawals were necessary that payroll

requirements might be met.

These neighboring bankers in turn

withdrew balances from New York, that they too might meet their
creditors.

Thua began the movement tor the restriction or de-

posit payments in other States.

The Federal Reserve Banks were

oonstantly being called upon for additional credit, ao that local
banks could meet the demands made upon them. 6
On

March 3, 1933, Governor Borner conterred with

Chioag~

4. Bernard Fay, Roosevelt and His America, Little Brown and co.,

Boston, 1933. P• 52.
--- --5. Bradfofdi P• 455. see also Faya P• 5l;Con1res11~nal
(Apr. 9;:)3 1 Vol. 12, p. 98; c . v. colt and •s. e t2'l';,
s,
! History ~ !!!!, Banking Cr1aia, Greenberg Pub.Co.N.Y':"l . p.6
6. Bradford, P• 455.

iig§,

ea,.
Cook Countr and Illinois banker• and
would be declared in Illinois.

deci~ed

that no morator1Uia

Almoat s1multaneousl1, however,

government otf1o1ala at Madison, Wisconsin announced that a two
weeks' banking holidaJ would become etfective ·1mmediate17·in tha'
State. 7
The incompetence of many bankers, and the disorganization ot

our bank1ng'syatem. became even more apparent as banks throughout
the country were forced to oloae. 8 The gravity or the depreaeion
was increased bJ' the spreading of the banktng panic to new regions.

Even Oongreaa was •larmed, for in Wallhington, a wave ot

hoarding bad begun.

Thia, according to Arthur Sears Henning;

Chioaso'' Dailz Tribune commentator on political events as they
happen in Washington; was the atmosphere at the
President•eleot Franklin D. Roosevelt cam.e. 9

cap~tal,

to which

President Hoover conterred with Senator Carter Glaaa, ot
Virginia, after failing to secure Kr. Rooaevelt•a consent to
unite in a recommendation to Congress on the matter of guarantee
of bank depoaita. 10 Since Mr. Glaaa•a authorit1 in the field
of banking and tinancial leg1alat1on was considered unexcelled,
it waa felt that he, a Democrat, might be prevailed upon, to urge

the President-elect to agree to recommend the desired legislation.
7. Chicago Dailz Tribune, Mar. 3, 1933.

a.

lorl~Tomorrow, (Mar. 15, 1933) Vol. 16, P• 243.
9. bhlcaso ~lir Tribune, Mar. 2, 1933.
lo.the Rew or TIIA£:a, Mar. 3, 1933J London Times, Mar. 4, 1933;
l'.h!. B\iii"1niii !!!..• Kar. a, 1933) P• 3.
.
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Mr. Glass, however, did not oommit himself in any way.

11

Attempts were made to secure a statement trom Mr. Roosevelt,
as to what course of action he would pursue to relieve the tense
situation, with which he would soon be 1dent1t1ed. 12 Other than
:r1aking 1 t clear that he would act "swiftly and certainly" he let
it be known that he would have nothing to say until after his
inauguration; or until he had ta.ken over the reins or power. 13

Ai!eunwhile the tanking crisis was becoming more acute, and
the hoarding fever was rising. 14 Plans tor the use of scrip as
emergency cash were being fostered in Harrisburg and

\~arren,

Pennsylvania; Nashville, Tennessee; and Jackson, Mississippi.

In

Dallas, Texas and in California, legislators too, were trying to
work out an exchange medium.15
In Illinois, despite the announcement of the previous day,
Governor Horner issued a proclamation declaring a brief moratorium.

New York agreed to do likewise.

ers were of the opinion that the

~oney

Foremost Chicago bank-

panic was a •national

affair and that it should be solved by action nation-wide in
scope.nl6

They stated that generally, Chicago banks were in

a stronger condition than banks elsewhere, including those ot

11. London Times, Mar. 3, 1933.
12. cfilca~o Daily Tribune, Mar. 3, 1933; The New York Times, Mar.

3,

19 3.

failz

13. Chicago
Tribune, Mar. 4, 1933.
14. London T mes, Mar. 3, 1933.
15. Chicago Dally Tribune, Mar. 4, 1933.
16. Ibid.
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rew York City. 17
Throughout the country, there were partial and complete
moratoria.
plete

In practically all places where there was not a com-

~orator1um,

deposit withdrawals were restricted.

Alabama

banks were restricted to a tive per-cent basis, as were many banks
elsewhere. 18
Said the London Times, when reviewing the American situation,
and speaking

or

the part Mr. Roosevelt would play as soon as

inaugurated,
"In some quarters the prediction is made
that he will at once order an embargo on
domestic gold withdrawals, and that, using
the power believed to·be vested in him by
Statute, he will place a pr't>q.ibitive tee
on the export of gold. It ls significant
that a number ·of leading men of his own
party are frankly of the belief that this
action should be taken ••• 'l'he dis·ease is desperate, and the remedy must be as 1mmed1ate
it is potent. It is right to say that,
whatever his private thoughts may be, nothing has disturbed Ur. Roosevelt's air of serene self confidence. ills courage is unquestioned, his willingness to make quick deoieione has often enough been noted; and he will
have instant need of both ••• A sense or relief
that the era or twelve years of Republican
rule has ended is part of the atmosphere, and
if nobody quite knows what Mr. Roosevelt's
prom~sed 0 new deal" w1ll be, the vast majority are thankful that it will at least be
something new. He will come into office with
tremendous power, power derived from the sheer
immensity ot his victory and fortl:fied by

•s

17.
18.

Chlc!SjO Daily Tribune, Mar. 4, 1933.

!bid.
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the fact that he owes it not to one or
more sections of the UnifSd States but to
the country as a whole."
In London, at this time, Americans who possessed dollars
had little monetary difficulty.

In Paris, banks refused to cash

checks on American banks which were affected by the bank holiday.
Private banks in Rome refused the American dollar at any price
even though there was general confidence in American banking resourcea. 20

A prominent German banker voiced the opinion that the

American crisis could easily be "surmounted" if the new leaders
themselves remained calm, for, "the psychosis of rear ls the
worst danger threatening a count:ry of vast resources like
Amer!ca.•21
On the eve of his inauguration, Mr. Roosevelt held a three
hour d1souss1on on anti-panic problems.

His advisors, those

present at the discussion were:

Jesse H. Jones and Harvey

Couch, Democrat directors of the

R~conatruction

Finance Corpora-

tlon; Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, leading Democratic authority on the Federal Reserve System; William H. Woodin who was
to be Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury; Professor
Raymond Moley an economics expert; and Senator Cordell Hull of

19. London Times, Mar. 4, 1933.
20. Chica&£ Dally Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933.
21. Ibid.

-
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Tennessee, who was to be Mr. Roosevelt's Secretary of State. 22
New York and Chicago bankers had asked that a national moratorium on banking be declared.

1n favor

or

President Hoover, it seemed was

the plan, but here again, Mr. Roosevelt would not com-

mit himself.

In Washington, it was generally understood that Mr.

Roosevelt planned to call an extraordinary session
to deal with the banking situation.

or

Congress,

All other problems were to

be put aside temporarily.23

Immediately after his inauguration, President Franklin Delan:>

Roosevelt summoned, to an in.formal conference, his Cabinet members
and leaders of Congress, to discuss tentative measures for bringing about some means for relieving the tense banking situation.?4
Only the day before, it had been stated in the London Times, that
upon assuming office, the President should use his power, to ob-

tain still more power, and with such authority, reorganise the
machinery ot the government, and obtain authority over Congress,
"without which no programme ot action can escape abortion."

It

further stated that, such he should do immediately while the depression was at its height, tearing not personal oonsequences.25
By the latter,

i~

was presumably meant, that he should ignore

what affect it might have upon his chances in 1936 for renomina22. The Bua1nese Week, (Mar. 8, 1933) P• 3. Aleo Chicago Dailz

¥r!'bune,

Mar.~1933.

23. Tne New York Times, Mar. 4, 1933.
24. Brad?ord;-p:- 457. Also Chica~o Dally !,ribune, Mar. 5, 1933;

The New York Times, Mar. 5,

25. toiidon-Trmii, Mar. 4, 1933.

~33.

tion and re-election.
Strangely enough, in his inaugural address, the new President
promised, "to lead his distressed countrymen out of the economic
wilderness---by means or a dictatorship if necesaary." 26 It was
with these ideas. in mind, that he assumed office on Saturday,
March 4 1 1933; and it waa on that morning that the American crisis
had reached its climax, with the closing ot the New York and Illinois banks.

27

The last of the forty-eight Statea to declare a
bank holiday, was Delaware. 28
The Sunday issue of the Chicago Dailz Tribune bore news ot
conditions in that city.

Having managed to get along without

banks on Saturday, ways were being figured out whereby business
might be carried on.

There were in.form.al discussions regarding

the use of Clearing House cert1f1oates, although nothing definite
could be decided upon until some action on the matter took place
in Washington. New York awaited the same 1ntormat1on. 29
In Washington, measures which were suggested by the Cabinet
members to the new President, were:

"Invocation of powers with which the wartime
trading with the enemy act invested in the
President, to prohibit the conversion or currency into gold. (2) Establish a corporation
the capital ot which would be subscribed

-'·•··------------------------------26. Chicago Daill Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933.
27. London Tlmea, Mar. B, 1933.
28. Chicago Daily Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933.
29.

-Ibid.
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by federal reserve banks and employed to
guarantee bank deposits. (3) Issue of
scrip as in the panic or 1907 ••• to take
the place of money. {4) Guarantee or bank
deposits under a plan whereby halt the
funds would be furnished by the federal
government."30
On Monday the President•s Bank Proclamation of the previoua
evening, occupied the attention or depositors and bankers throughout the country, as the "whole financial mechanism of the United
Statea ••• tor the time being had ce-.aed to function."

This

proclamation.of a nation-wide banking moratorium, was looked
upon with approval by leading bankers who felt that Clearing
House certitioatea might be used with the aame success as in
1907. 31
As the President'• program we.a aiming to restore public con·
fidence, and to reetore the banking machinery, that industry
might not suffer, people throughout the country began to adjust
themselves rather cheertullJ to the unusual and difficult situation.

Postal Savings banks, being opened tor buaineaa, received

tremendous deposits because confidence in theae 1nat1tut1ona had
not waned. 32
Although Congress had not convened plans which would facilitate emergenc7 banking leg1alat1on in both Houses were being
30. Chicago ~a1i1 Tribune, Mar. 5, 1933.

The New or Times, iar. 6, 1933. Aleo London Time, Mar. 6,
Dallz Tribune, Mar. 6, 1933.
~
32. Manoheater uardlan, LOndon, Mar. 7, 1933; Also Review ot
Reviews, (Feb. I934) Vol. 90. p. 11.

31.

111!3;--a-h~o
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worked out.

A historic plan, which would bind support through

caucus majority rule, was adopted by the Democrats 1n the Senate.

By this method members were bound in advance to cast their votes
"en bloc."

The7 went even further, however, and agreed 50 to 3

that the caucus could bind all members, with onl7 a slight major•
ity.

This latter agreement would not hold true in the House of

Representatives, for there a two•thlrds majority la necessary to
bind all members in a part7

caucua4:a~

At the same time; the House llemocrats were also busy working
out an emergeno1 program which would give the Pree1:dent the
greatest possible authority during the oriais 1 and to facilitate
the drawing up of a "new and permanent" legislative program re•
lat1ng to banks and banking•

or

It is,

course, understood that

at this time there were 1 in reality, no committees in the House,
as such could only be elected atter Congress convenedj but those

who would 1n all probability compose the Banking and Currency
committee, and the House leaders who had previously conferred v4th
the President, began to work out a program which would be ready
for presentation as soon aa the House should be organized on
Thursday.

With this set•up in both Houses, the Democrats felt

they had everything under control•

In this way they might almost

instantaneoual7 secure passage ot any urgent legislation, without

---

33. The New York Times, Mar. 7 1 1933.
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fear of any revolt by 1ndependents.34

They felt that at such a

time, it was inopportune to discuss details.

The

essential

matter was that the Administration should make decisions which it
considered would be most effective, having the assurance that the
35
nation would cheerfully fall in line.
In New York and in Chicago, word was still awaited trom·
Washington, whereby the banks might issue the Clearing House certificates which they had in readiness.

Frank R. Elliott, presi-

dent of Chicago's Clearing House, stated,
"The purpose of clearing house cert1t1catea is
to manufacture an additional sound currency
to meet the demand ••• If the banks pay out
currency and gold the people will hoard it.
Therefore the current need in an emergency
like the present one is to give them a kind
ot money that the7 won•t hoard. The clearing
house certificates will fill this need."36
Upon receiving notice, however, that the Government waa not
1n favor of the uae of such acr1p, the Clearing House of ticiala
gave

up this soheme. 37
It was understood that President Roosevelt would ask Con-

gress to confirm the powers which he asaum.ed, when he proclaimed
the bank holiday.

38

On March 9 1 1933, when Congress convened,

34. The New York Times, Mar. 7, 1933.
35. y;rppiiiiiin;-Iii'terpretations of 1933-1935, P• 22.
36. Chicago DaIS1 Tribune, Mar:-7~3~
37. IE!a. lar. , 1033.
38. toiiaon Times, Mar. 9, 1933.
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the President's message_ was read.

Because of its very great 1m-

portance, we quote:

"On March 3, banking operations in the United
States ceased ••• Suftice it to say that the Government has been compelled to step in for the
protection or the depositors and the business
of the Nation. our first task is to reopen all
sound banks •••• I ask of the Congress the immediate enactment of legislation giving to the executive branch or the Government control over
banks for the protection of depositors ••• I ask
amendments to the Federal Reserve Act to provide
such additional currency, adequately secured, as
it may become neoessar, to issue to meet all demands for currency ••• without increasing the
unsecured indeb!Sdness of the Government of the
United States.n
He then stressed the need tor immediate action to allay unwarranted doubts regarding banks, and to create a new relationship
40
between the banka and the people.
It was in response to this urgent plea, that Congress passed

the Emergency Eank1ng Eill•

Of the four fairly distinct sets of

provisions, the one which interests us particularly, is the

tire~

which confirms not only the provisions of the President's proclamation, but any subsequent ones which he might make regarding the
"hoarding and export ot gold and the reopening ot the banks."
He might require holders of gold to turn it over to the Government in

e~ehange

for other currency, under penalty for failing to

do so.

Too, for the period of the emergency, he was empowered to

39. ·

Con~reaslonal

40.

Ibi •

Record,

~

Cong. l. Seas. Vol. 77.part l,p.45.
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prevent member banks rrom carrying on any business other than
that which might be consented to by the Treasury Departm&nt. 41
Because of the extent of power granted the President by the
Seventy-third Congress, during its special session. the London
Times spoke of him as a bank dictator; and stated that f'ull
powers were given him after he had "urged upon Congress the olear
neces$1ty for immediate action, since the continuance or strangulation of banking facilities was untbinkable." 42
Using these powers, the President extended the National
banking holiday, ao that whatever ateps necessary might be taken
to prepare tor the reopening or sound banks of the Federal Reserve System. 43 Fearing puniahment and publicity under the terms

ot the Emergency Banking Act, hoarders

or

gold made haste to re44
turn their hoards to banka all over the country.
It is said
that in Chicago alone, "millions of dollars in gold flowed into
the vaults of several loop banka.n 4 5
At a later date, in refutation or the statement of President
Roosevelt, of March 3, 1933, that, "the mechanics of o1v111zat1on had come to a dead stop", Mr. Hoover made the statement,

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

73.

"We had no bank panic from the crash of the
boom in i,92g· ••• we had no panic at the moat
dangerous point in the depression when our
banks were weakest in the spring of 1932.
There was no panic before the election ot
1932 ••• They (the people) became scared a tew
~eeks before the inauguration of the New Deal
on March 4; 1933 •• because ••• people awoke to
the fact that promises given in the campaign
would be violated ••• Buainess slackened ita
energies. Shrewd speculators shipped their
money abroad at fabulous profits. Bankers
tried to protect themselves. The public in
blind tear demanded gold and the "covenants"
or the United Statea which called tor gold.
Some of them were soared at bank• by the
destructive publication of R.F.c. loans. The
banking structure was not insolvent. After
the banks were closed, it was found that the
solvent banks ••• comprised 92 per cent ot the
banking strength of the country. The·President himself stated they were sound. Subsequently more banks were found sound and
reopened.•46
It was on the evening of Sunday, March 12, 1933, that President Roosevelt made a radio address in which he spoke on the
f

1na.nc1al crisis and explained the purpose of the bank

which his prev1otis proclamation had brought about.47

hol~daya

He prefaced

his remarks with words to the effect, that this addreae was to be
in explanation of recent Government legislation, and.. in appreciation of the attitude with· which the people at large bad
accepted the aocompaJl11ng inconveniences.
He briefly spoke of the customary use made, by banka, of

46.

47.

Herbert Hoover, American Ideals Veraua the New Deal,
Scribner Press, N.Y. (no pub. aa£e) pp.~-44:" ---Chicago Daily Tribune, Mar. 13, 1933.
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deposits entru.sed to them for safe keeping, that is, putting them
to work keeping the wheels of industry in action.

Said he,

"Because of the undermined confidence on a part
of the public, there was a general rush by a
large portion or our population to turn bank
deposits into currency or gold---- a rush ao
great that the soundest banks could not get
enough currency to meet the demand. The reason
for this was that on the spur of the moment it
was ••• 1mpoas1ble to sell perfectly sound asaets
or a bank and convert them into oaah except at
panic prices tar below their real value. By the
afternoon ot March 3, scarcely a bank 1n the
country was open to do business. Proclamations
temporarily closing them in whole or part had
been 1aeued by the governors in almoat all the
States. It was then that I 1aaued the proclamation providing tor the nation-wide bank holiday,
and this was the first step 1n the Government's
reconstruction ot our financial and economic
fabrio.

"The second step waa the leg1slat1on ••• paased by
the Congress cont1rm1ng my proclamation and
broadening my power• ao that it became poeaible ••
to extend the hol1d8.J and 11.ft the ban of that
holiday graduallY', Thia law also gave author1t7
to develop a program ot rehabilitation of our
banking facilities. I want to tell our o1tizene
in every part or the Nation that the National Congreaa--Republ1cana and Demoerata al1ke--ahowed by
this action a devotion to public welfare and a
realization or the emergency and the neeeaait7
for ·~i3d that ia difficult to match in our history.
He stated that during the interim, the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing was preparing the new currency which would be sent out
to the twelve Federal Reserve banks•

48. ·congressional Record, 73

asi.

Con~.

to~

issuance where assets

1. Seas., Vol.

77~

part l. p.

See also eh!cago Da111 r!Eune, Mar. 1!, 1tr3.

were good.

Aa if in answer to the anticipated que1"1' as to why

all banks were not to be reopened at the same time, the President
continued,
"Your Government does not intend that the history of the past few 1ears shall be repeated.
We do not want and will not have another epidemic of bank failures. As a result we start
tomorrow, Monday, (March 13, 1933) with the
reopening of the banks 1n the twelve Federal
Reserve bank cit1ea-•those which on first examination by the Tre&S\U'Y have already been
found to be alr1ght. 8 49 He then mentioned the order in which other banks would reopen, and brought out the tact that no sound bank would be a
dollar worse oft, than it had been when 1t wa4 forced to cloae
its doors.

Further, he stressed the point that peoples' tunda

had been handled in aome cases by either diahoneat or incompetent
bankers who had betrayed the trust placed in them by resorting to
speculation and in making of unwise loans.

Such behavior on their

part had weakened the confidence of the public, and therefore it
was the work

or

the Government to provide a maoh1ne17 and the

meana whereby the financial structure would regenerate public
confidence.

Such then waa the aim ot the recent leg1alat1on.50

So it was that on Monday, March 13 1 1933 all sound banks in
the twelve Federal Reserve cities reopened.

Banks 1n some 250

clearing house o1t1ea were reopened on Tuesday: while all remain•
49.

Con~ressional

P•

Bl.

so.~·

Record 73 Cons• 1. Sees. Vol. 77, part. l,
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1ng sound banks were reopened on Wednesday. 51

This made it

possible for the countrr to do buainess again, with the use of
about ninety per eent of its banking resources.
seemed to have forgotten their distrust

or

Depositors

banking 1nst1tut1ona,

for everywhere, deposits in the reopened banke, exceeded withdre.wala.52
Depositors had accepted the word of the President, regarding
the safety of their deposits in the reopened banks, for, says an
editorial "A Good Start"

in~

Business !.!.,!! 1 of March 22, 1933,

"The old banking ayetem received its death blow with the moratorium ••• Old banke may reopen under their old names, but they cannot
be the

same old banks ••• The banka are reopening now with what

amounts to a gove:rnment guarantee.

The federal government and
various states are certifying that reopened banks are sound." 53
Many persons regarded the reopening of the banka, merely

as

the end of an exciting week, during which they had been without
funds.

To them, the crisis had passed.

and to those in the banking world, it was

To those at Washington,
t~e

efforts to attain some form of rehabilitation.
greatness

or

termination of
To them onl1 the

the banking collapse and the need tor reform been

51. Bradford, P• 459. Also Manchester Guardian, Mar. 11, 1933.
52. Ibid., P• 460.
53. The Business Week, (Mar. 22, 1933) P• 32 and (Mar. 29, 1933)

p.-4.

-
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revealed. 54
There were, however, thousands of depositors who suttered
heavy losses in banks which would not reopen.
of recovery was purely a surface one. 55

Thus the appearance

!!.!!, Nation, of March 29,

1933, refers to the portion of the President's inaugural speech

in which he demanded that, "the money changers be driven out ot
the templen, but, continued the writer 1 those money changers, big

New York bankers, bad gone to Washington to contribute their bit
to the act of legislation which became the Emergency Banking
Act. 56

The most favorable opportunity tor rebuilding the banking
structure of the United States, presented itself in March of 1933
simultaneously with the collapse.

Guy Greer, author of "Wanted:

Real Banking Reform", Harpera, (Oct. 1933), intimated that a
genuinely national commercial banking system might have been constructed trom the •debris of the forty•n1ne assorted eyatema which
had broken down.• 57 The moratorium, 1ta purpose and effects, was
still fresh in the minds of the people.

While in that mental

state, they through their representatives in Congress might have,
with comparative ease, brought about the enactment
banking reforms.

or

worthwhile

True, emergency measures were enacted, but

54. E.F.Bro'l'lll, "America Meets the Emergency",
(May, 1933). Vol. 38, P• 203.

~nt

55. The Nation, (Mar. 29, 1933). Vol. 136. P• 330.ed.

56. lbfd.
-57. ~Greer, •wanted: Real Banlcing Reform,"
Vol. 167.p.533.

H1storz.
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there was no follow up by the passage of laws which would establish a "single system adequate tor the needs of the Nation."58

Glancing backward for a moment, we recall that from several
sources, we had been made aware ot the fact, that bank failures
did not begin with the depreaaion.

Several thousand had failed

during the seemingly proeperoua years.

In Bankers Monthly, ot

November, 1929, Mr. H. B. Stronck, author of Bank Administration,
made the statement that between 1921 and 1928 5004 banks bad
suspended. 59 The natural suspicion should be., that something waa
wrong with the banking system.

When the Senate Committee on

Banking and Currency began its investigation, it round, as had

been suspected, that Federal Reserve funds bad been uaed tor
speculative purpoaes.so
It was Ernest K. Lindley who wrote "Wall Street Undor the
New Deal", Literarz Digest, (July 22,

1~33)

and in it said that

one did not have to accept the theory which made the depreaaion
the outcome or the frenzied speculation of 1929, in order to
condemn the leaders in the banking world, for their failure to

58. HaJiiers, Vol. 167 1 P• 533.
f. Flfllll, "Wanted: Real Banking Retormn, current H1atol'Ji
59. Jo
(Jan. 1934) Vol. 39, P• 394. Also E.F.Brown., "Roosevelt Takes
Control", Current Hietorz, (Apr. 1933) Vol. :58. P• 83;
Bradford, p. 461; George Soule, "A Program for Banking•, New
Republic, (Var. 29, 1933) Vol. 74, P• 176; Bankers Montblf;'""'"
Rand Mclally and co., Chgo. (Nov. 1929) PP• 3o-!2.
60. Bradford, P• 462.
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avert speculative exceaaes.61

The inquiry, made by the Senate

Banking Committee, showed among those, who were leaders or the
"wild rush up-hill and over the precipice", referring of course
to speculation, were the heada ot some of the country-ta largest
62
banks. The House of Morgan was among these.
Once again Senator Glaae had gone about bis work on a banking reform bill, which was introduced in the Senate on March 17,
1932.

He was determined that no changes should be made in the

section which wae intended to check stock market speculation.

It

was understood that some New York bankere were making every possible effort to prevent passage of the bill.

They objected to
the separating of investment and commercial bank1ng. 63
On the other hand, Senator Glass waa not an advocate ot

guarantee of bank deposits, and thia was the pet issue ot Representative Steagall who was the Chairman of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency.

The latter's bill was passed in the House

on May 27, 1932, but did not come to a vote in the Senate; whereas the Glass bill had not been passed by the House.64
The bill wae modified and reintroduced in the 73d Congress.
One strong Congressional group wanted its immediate passage; but
61. Ernest K. Lindley, "Wall Street Under the New Deal", L1terarz
D1~eet, (July 1933) Vol. 116, P• 4.
62. tl erary Digest, (July 1933) Vol. 116, p. 4.
63. The New York Times, Mar. 18, 1932. Also Mar. 19, 1932; The
Viii'iiii'ia Week, (May 24, 1933) P• 32.
--64. The New RepuE11c, (Feb. 1933) Vol. 73, P• 325 ed; The Bus1iiiia-wie~, (Apr. 12, 1933) P• 3; Congressional Digiit,~
(Apr.-i93'3) Vol. 12, P• 97.

so.
it became evident, that unless it was made a part of the Pres!•
dent•s emergency program., its passage was doubtfu1. 65
On May 10, 1933, Senator Wheeler presented to the Senate a

petition from "sundry oitizena" of Montana, requesting Congress
to "investigate prosecute and convict to the fullest extent of
the law, i t found guilty, the large banking institutions ot New
York City and elsewhere, especially the Morgan Banking Company,
New York City, N. Y."

This petition was referred to the Com-

mittee on Banking and Currency and ordered printed in the Record,

minus the signatures thereto attaohed. 66
On June 15 1 1933, Senator Borah asked that two artiolea,
relative to Senator Glaaa and hie aot1v1tiea, be printed in the
Record.

His request was granted.

One article was taken from the

9hrist1an Science Monitor, and the other from
Tribune ot May 28 1 1933.
us.

~ ~

York Herald

A quotation trom the latter interests

"In his Federal Reserve retol'Dl bill, he (Senator Glass)

proposed and propoaea to inflict almost violently drastic punishments upon any undue diversion of Federal credit into speculative
channela.• 67
From the general trend ot the remainder of the article, it
is given us to understand that Mr.

65.
66.
67.

l

Gla~s,

a Democrat

or

the old

The Business Week, (Ma7 24, 1933) P• 32.
COiigresa1on8.l-niCord, 73 Cong. l, Sesa. Vol. 77, part 3,
P• 3106.
Ibid.,
............... part 6. PP• 6069-71 •
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school, was not in full accord with some of the ideas of President Roosevelt's new dea1. 68 In regard to the President's
Emergency Banking Bill, "he supported it with all the loyalty
that was consistent with a simultaneous savage asservation of
its obnoxiousness to his pr1ne1ples.n 69

President Roosevelt wasn't particularly anxious to have the
Glass-Steagall banking bill passed at the special session.

He

allowed it to be believed, that he was looking forward to the
enactment ot legislation, which would be more tar-reaching, in
the near tuture. 70 Eventually agreement was reached, however,
and the bill passed both Houses of Congress juat prior to the
adjournment of the special session.

On June 16, 1933, at eleven

o'clock that morning, President Roosevelt approved the bill which
71
"supplements and strengthens" the Federal Reserve Law.
According to Bradford, the Banking Act ot 1933 was about aa
satisfactory a b1t of legislation as might have been expected under the c1rcumstancea 72 Said Guy Greer, Har~era Magazine,
"The Glass Bill ••• leaves the basic elements
of weakness in our banking structure essentially the same aa before. It does indeed
str1ke ••• at some of the most spectacular
abuses which have occurred in the employment
68. Ibid., Also L1tera~ Di§eat, (July 22,1933) Vol. 116, P• 31.
69· ?JOrlgresa1onaI Reco , 7 Cong.lfSess.Vol.77, part 6, p. 6071.
70. t1£erary D!~ea£, Vol. 116, P• 3 •

The Ne1'Yor Tlmea, June l7r 1933. Also Bradford, P• 463;
"ffi.irrent !Iito~, (Jan. l934J Vol. 39, p. 399; Ibid.,
tneo. 1934) Vo • 41. P• 259.
72. Bradford, P• 471.
71.
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of bank credit for speculat1on ••• The moat reassuring aspect ••• 1s that through the insurance
plan it holds the hope of eventual unification
of all commercial banking under federal control.
Possibly this will provide an opportunity tor
the grad¥al development or a genuine national
system." ~
The Nation through

~

editorial voiced the opinion that all

persons who have an interest in sound banking must approve some
of the provisions

or

the new Glass-Steagall Act, particularly the

provision which compels the separation ot security affiliates
from commercial banka, and the one which forbids a bank to grant
any of 1ts officers a loan.

As to the provision whioh guarantees

bank deposits, there was some akept1e1em, part1o'darly, since
states which had previously tried the guaranty plan had abandoned
1t.74

Briefly stated, the Banking Act ot 1933 (Glass-Steagall
Banking Reform Bill) is directed toward a,
" •••• unified banking system; provides a limited deposit guarantee; requires divorcement
or security affiliates from banks under government supervision; compels private banks
to give up either the deposit or security
business; requirea stricter regulation ot
national banks; forbids loans by banks to
their oft1cera; seeks to limit the volume or
loans to be made on stocks obvioualy tor the
purpose of speculation; and provided the
means for direct removal of bank officers who
-are known to be guilty of undesirable oonduct."75
73. Guy Greer, "Wanted• Real Banking Reform", ~arpere,(Oct. 1933)
Vol. 167. PP• 533•35.
74. The Nation, (June 28, 1933) Vol. 136, PP• 709-10 ed\t
75. ifJ:ii New York Timea, June 17, 1933; Aleo H. Parker Willia,
;~r~9~rn~r~~
i~tr:it:JAi&a3a!tocg:%obl~3 t~3X~ 1 • 39 '
PP• l5o-e4.
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After the passage of the bill, the Federal Reserve Board announced that non-aff111'ated banka had already- begun to make application tor membership 1n the Federal Reserve Syatem. 76 It waa
still obvious, however, that even though enacted, the bill waa
not well received by the American Bankers Association.

Its presi-

dent, Francis H. Sisson, of New York, stated that the Glaae•
Steagall Banking Act was not a baa1cally sound measure, and that
1t would eventually enforce lta own repeai. 77 He further atated
that bankers regretted that Senator Glass and the members ot the
Banking Committee "have yielded to importunities and included a
so-called insurance of deposits plan in the banking reform bill •• n 78
George V. McLaughlin, president ot New York State Bankers
Association, felt that the Act was the "fruit of much careful
study and honest thou.&ht+"

He

felt, too, that there had been no

desire to penaliae banks, but an aim to strengthen the country's
banking syatem. 79
Winthrop

w.

Aldrich, Chairman Governing Board and President

or Chaae National· Bank, New York City, wae entirely in aympath:y
with the "divorcing by law of security aff111atea from commercial
banka. 0

80

s::>-called

Mr. A• A. Berle Jr. a member ot President Roosevelt's
9

bra1n trust•, stated that the Act was a "transitional

76. The New York Times, June 17, 1933.
77. 'ffii' New Yori !lmea, June 23, 1933.
78. !1ii !iiikers »a9az!ne, (June 1933) Vol. 126, P• 563.
79. ldim., (July l 33) Vol. 127, p. 109.
ao. Iaem., (Apr. 1933) Vol. 126, P• 305.

-
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measure and that more new banking legislation should be expected. 081
It was therefore in accordance with the proviaione of the
, Banking Act of 1933 that bankers, either willingly or unwillingly,
began to set their houses in order, ao that their reorganization
might be completed.
by

Further legislation, such as was predicted

Mr. Berle, culminated in the Banking Act ot 1935.

We shall

not. however, concern ourselves with this legislation.

That the banking situation throughout the country waa on the
upgrade was indicated in a broadcast interview on June 18, 1933,
during which Louie McHenry Howe, secretary to President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, stated that or the 4887 banks which closed,
only 1005 had so remained. 82 It was Walter Lippmann, who very
adequately said, "A year ago, men were living from hour to hour,
in the midst of a crisis

or

enormous proportions, and all they

could think about was how they could survive 1t."
as of February- 27, 1934, he said• "the mass

covered their courage and their hope.

or

Then speaking

people have re-

They are no longer hys-

terically anxious about the immediate present.

They have re-

covered not only some small part of their standard of lite, but
83
also their selt-posaeasion."

81. fbe New York Times, June 27, 1933.
82. The New !Ork Times, June 19, 1933.
83. tfPpiiiiiiin-;-!iiterpretations 1933-1935, P• 249.

CHAPTER VII.
1907-06 VERSUS 1929·33------------Comparative study of the causes,
effects, results, similarities and
d1as1milar1t1es.

CHAPTER VII.
1907-08 VERSUS 1929•33
It is the purpose

or

this chapter to serve as a comparative

digest of the two crises.

Most statements herein have been ac-

counted for in previous chapters; therefore footnotes shall be
made only tor additional c1tationa.
Our two cr1ees had the appearance ot having come out ot a
clear sky; but events show that each had been years in the
making. (~here were some .features ot a1m1lar1t7 1n each, for fundamentally each was the result of too great act1v1tr in the
fields open to speculation.

The word speculation generally causes one to vizualize an
activity which is associated with persons of huge income, and an
accomparqing amount ot leisure, which may be spent in a form ot
luxurious living, provided by the returns of their speculative
ventures.

In part, the above is true.

In 1907 and 1929, the symptoms of the approaching crises
> ...

were almost identical.

1t\\ages had reached. an unpr.effde.nt:ed: high;

luxuries were everywhere; and speculation was rampant.
earli~r

In the

pani o the apeculat1 ve movement was . confined to the

,r , : ... ,

1ll~y.d people.

1

Whereas, in the

I

1

,, . . •

Liatjter,

men and women of moder-

ate means, who saw a chance to get something through the least
85.

86.

expenditure of labor or effort, floundered about with thoae

or

wealt:q,,.__J.n the whirlpool of speculation.
<'-

Just as many had placed the blame for the panic ot 1907
upon President Theodore Roosevelt, _.eo, ·the Hoover Administration
was s:lmilatt117 charged tor the depreaeing conditions of 1929-33.
In the latter instance, it was said, that t:l:le Republicans had
taken the reins of the Government at a time when America was
looked upon as the strongest nation in the world; but that they
left her a weakened and divided America, whose faith 1n God and
l
in herself had waned.
,/ ~. ·~

1

The breakdown, in the ea.Plier ~:rt a1s 1 was prec1p1 tated by
the combat between the monarchs ot Wall Street, and F. Augustus
Heinze and hie affiliates.

The heels

or

the recognized powers

had come down upon the heads ot the would•be usurpers, because
of their interests in copper.
'

/

In the-

::;.~·.•.,., '.' .

,··
.'-

more--»~-"Oataatrophe,
....,, .. _,,,, ..
. -· ...... .. ... . .. '
~. ~··--

,. ,

,

the depression was ushered

in by the atoek market crash of October 1929. - Such had come
about because of the failure
against the granting

or

or

:~'.'.-~'.' -' :. ·r:··· ' /

d.}

banking heads to h1nftrwarn1ngs

doubt.ful loans, and against wild specu-

lation.
When busineas aat1v1t1ee were slowed down by bank rune and
hoarded currency in 1907 premiums were ottered for currency, and

_)
1. Bernard Fay, Roosevelt and His America, (Little Brown and co.,
Boston, 1933). p. 163. --- ~
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Clearing House oert1t1catea were resorted to as a meana ot aiding
the return or normal oond1t1ona.

The uae ot Clearing Houser cer-

tificates was anticipated in the latter crisis.

Although they

were printed and made ready for circulation, they did not come
into uae, tor in the Emergency Banking Bill, a provision was
made tor the issuance of additional currency.
The outstanding

ditterenc~

in the two disturbances,.,... was

that the latter, with its epidemic of bank failures, was more
widespread and generally more disastrous. because it continued
longer.

In the latter, too, the average man suffered most.

Funds which he had deposited in the local bank against a rainy
day were wiped away.
In the wake of the panic of 1907 came the ref orma in banking.

The first ot these, the Postal Savings System, provided tor

Postal Savings bank@,- to encourage thrirt,.. by providing safe depos1 tor1ea for those who had lost faith in ordinary banking institutions.
--q,.A• ea!:i.t

Government.

In Government depositories there was safet7 ror.

1

-lHF'.~

payment or depos1 ts was solemnly pledged by the
The second, the Federal Reserve System, was estab-

lished under the Act which not only made for the establishment
of Federal Reserve banks, but which would furnish an elastic
currency, and a more adequate supervision of banking 1n the
United States.

"

I

f':

,•/

ea.

With these reforms, it was felt that future -..e•i·l:!:ng;-era---r......r
as bankingwas--eoncerned, would .be smooth sailing.
ted, the country was soon calm and undisturbed.

...

;r;~ ~:r

then broke the rec8f1·t··atorm.

Thus protec-

Years passed, and

Strange as it may seem, it was

found that the Federal Reserve System, which had been inaugurated
to make impossible the recurrence of conditions such oa characterized the financial breakdown in 1907, had been, to a certain
extent, an aid to those who were to a large degree responsible
for the 1929 crash.

To block further abuse
was again sought.

or

the system, remedta1 legislation

In the meantime, many bewildered depositors

withdrew their funds, and redeposited them in the Postal Savings
~

1nstitut1ons, ~e-·oari'klng ·haven ot those-- t1m1-d:-1:trarr11'.lttal.e .who
had f alt-h---on-ly in the ·Government •

In Congress, political views! constitutional pr1v1legea, and
personal oonviotions regarding adequate banking legislation, were
for the time being1 put aside to speed up such action as the
President deemed necessary to bring the country out ot chaos.

In

so doing, Congress was most certainly expressing the desires of
a panic stricken populace.

In due
Reserve Aet.

se~son,

two acts

or

legislation amended the Federal

As these have been discussed at length in chapters

five and six, your attention is merely directed to the Glaee-
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Steagall Act of February 27, 1932, enacted during the Hoover
Administration, and the new Glass-Steagall Bill commonly known as
the Banking Act of 1933, enacted during the Administration of
President F. D. Roosevelt.
In 1907-08 no great part was played by President Theodore
Roosevelt in stabilizing the financial structure of the country.
Contrary-wise, in 1929-32, efforts were made by President Herbert
Hoover to bring about some adjustment

or

conditions.

Ria attempts

were followed by the very unusual but effective measures of Pres!•
cent Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Remedial legislation, in the earlier

instance, was enacted in the two succeeding administrations.

In

the latter caae, such legislation began in the stricken administration and was completed in the following one.
It may be reasonably concluded that there waa nothing in the
earlier crisis which was in any way comparable to: the Reconstruction Finance Corpcration; the banking moratorla; the
Elnergenoy Banking Act; the loyalty of a political

pa~ty

to a

President; and the--~ffented. precision with which a program,
aimed at banking rehabilitation,- was legislated.
According to Lippmann, "the president had the insight to
see that

~he

crisis was fundamentally political in the sense that

the people had become contuaed and frightened because the government and their institutions were paralyzed and impotent.

Seeing
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this, he took the decision to ask Congress for a concentration of'
power in the executive.

That was what broke the panic, opened

the banks, restored the morale of the nation .... "2
Speaking of the President's success, Fay attributed it to

his boldness, shrewdness, and knowledge; and classified him as
being the "greatest living pol1t1c1an." 3
Having been severely dealt with, it m91 be some time before
the average American citizen dares to risk his all, as in 1929.
Those whose financial status enables them to tempt

-t~~B'""of'

speculat~ill find that tte.iMtnt banking legislation has enabled

loana to be made which would supplement their funds tor such purposes, lees easily obtained.
~

1

moat fitting statement with which to bring t1tft' contrasts

~/ 6if:a,~-

a,

Business Week. It informs us that the leather seats ot the
to

comes

from an editorial in the June

1933 1 The

brokers' otfides are again being occupied by the momentary m1l11ona1res of 1929.
quotations.
emotions.

Too, the average man 1a watching the market

There 1s,

howe~er,

something different in their

Formerly, as they watched, they had a conviction that

prices would continue to rise; but, said the writer, "experience
has shown that the most amiable stock may turn and bite !ta

2.
3.

Lippmann, p. 263.
Fay, P• 344.
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We may, as long as this attitude continues, be reason-

owner."'

,~. ,f·J i

ably secure against a cr1a1s of such lne&ption..,; in the near

future.

But, we must keep in mind Thomas Jefferson's philosophi-

cal remark, as quoted by Charles Warren in Bankruptcy

!!! the

United States,
"No man of reflections wl:ohad ever applied
the lessons of the paat to the present time,
could fail to foraee the issue though he might
not calculate the moment at which it would happen ••• All that stuff called scrip, ot whatever
description, waa folly or roguery, and under a
resemblence to genuine public paper 1t buoyed
itself up to a par with that. It has been a
severe lesson; yet such is the public gullib1l1 t7. in the hands of cunning and unprincipled
men, that it is doomed by nature to receive
these lessons once in an age at least. "5.
·

4.
5.

The Business Week, (July 8, 1933) P• 18.
Warren;-Bankruptcy in the United States, (Harvard
Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mas&. 'rn!5) P• 12.
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY
While engaged in research, the writer came upon much material pertinent to the thesis.

These materials may be listed under

four specific headings, namely:
cals, Newspapers, and Books.

Government Documents, Periori-

Each type had an especial value.

Government documents were the authentic records or remedial legielat1on, Newspapers and periodicals provided all contemporary'
d1seuas1ons of events which had a direct bearing upon our topic.
Worthwhile books were rew in number, but these were helptul in
supplying some background data, and some current information.
To expedite the use of this bibliography, d1via1ona have
been made which correspond to the chapter divia1ona.

Each ot

these is, in turn, arranged according to types of articles used.
HISTORY OF .BANKING PRIOR TO 1907
Some exceedingly fine material, relative to the earlier
period, is found in Frederick A. Bradford, Monet
Longmans Green and Co., N. Y., 1936.
excellent.

~

Banking,

Its bibliograpb:J' 1• moat

On a whole, however, thia publication is more useful

for the latter part of the thesis.

A few brier statements per-

tinent to the controversy over the establishment of the· First and
Second United States Banks, may be obtained from Harold R. Bruce,

92.

93.

American Parties

~Politics,

Charles A. Conant, !

~isto!7

Henry Holt and Co., N. Y., 1936.

!!!. Modern Banks .2.! Issue, G. P.

Putnam's Sons, N. y., 1915, is a valuable secondary source.
For general information regarding the financial structure ot
the United States before 190'7, Davis R. Dewey, Financial Histon

.2f

~

United States, Longmana Green and Co., N. Y., 1928, ia

excellent.
ces.

Thia book haa ample footnotes dealing with the sour-

Roy L• Garis,

Macmillan co., H•

~rlnc1elea

Y~,

£!.

Kon•l• Credit

1934 1 may alao be

~

Bankipg,

used~

There are several volumes which contain the text of speeches
made for and againat the chartering

or

the United States Banks•

---Important Off1cial

Statements made by Alexander Hamilton mq be found in The Works

2!

Alexander Hamilton--Comprisil!S

Reports;

!!!

Improved Edition .2.f

!!!.!.

~

~

Federalists, -2!!. The

!.!!

Constitution
in 1778 and Pac1f1cus on ---the Proclamation --of
........
..,__.;...;;..,;...;.;..o.......,-. Written
-~~-- --- ----- --Neutralitl Written !!!

~·

published by William and Whiting,

N. Y•, 1810•
For expressions made by Andrew Jack.eon against the rechartering or the bank, aee the following: Great Debates !!!, American
Historr, edited by Marion M. Miller, CUrrent Literature Pub. co.,
N. Y., 1913; J. A. Richardson, ! Compilation£!_
Papers

.2.! !e!. Presidents

~--~,

!a!

Mea&!,688

~

Published bf the authority

of Congress, 1900; and the .!!!2 Message

.2! President Andrew

94.

Jackson _2!! Returning

!a! ~

tions, Jul7 10, 1832 Together

~ ~ ~
~

!!!!

Senate

~

Bia Objec-

Speech gt, Bon. Daniel

------lican Central Committee Journal Preas,

Webster, Relative to the Same, published by the National Repub---~--

(no cop7r1ght date).

It

is a ver, old publication.

Arthur Scbleainger, Political
United States 1829•1925, Macmillan

~

Social History S?!.

co.,

~

N. Y., 1928, deala brief-

ly with the investments undertaken by banka prior to 1907.
PERIODICALS used tor this period were .rew.

Ard rew Carnegie,

"The Worat Banking System in the World", Outlook, Outlook Co.,
N. Y., (Fe. 1908) Vol. 88, is good.

An

interesting bit of materi•

---(Oct. 1907) Vol. 85.

al is contained in an editorial which appears in The Nation, Bew
York Evening Post Co., N. Y.,

The most valuable periodical article is E.A.

Goldenweiae~,

"Highlights in History o.r American Banking Legislation,"

~

greaaional Digest, Munse7 Bldg.; Wash. D. D. (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10.
Dr. Goldenweiser is director, Division of Research and Statistics
of the Federal Reserve Board, and hie article is very tactual.
BANKING CRISIS IN THE PANIC OF 1907
Material dealing with the pan1o ot 1907 1a o.r var,1ng degrees

ot value.

The Heinze affair which is the nucleus ot the cataatro•

phe, is discussed in Charles A. Collman, .Q!!.£ M1aterioua Panics
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1830-1930, William Morrow and Co., N. Y. 1931, and inc. B•.
Glaasock, !!!!, War .2£.
Wolves

~

.2! !.!!.! _s_t_r_e_e_t,

Copper K1nga 1 Builders

!!

Butte !!!,!!

The Bobba•Merrill co., N. Y• 1935.

Mr.

Olaesock used newspaper tiles, magazines, and mader personal interviews, while in queat ot his material.
enlightening.

This book is moat

It deals with the activities ot F. Auguatua

Heinze, first aa a miner, then as a man of Wall Street.
Clement Juglar, ! Br1et Riston;

.!!.!:

Panics

~

Their Period·

!.2!Y:, Occurrence ,!!! .!a!!!. _u_n1_te_d_ . ,.s....t ....a ...te.,..e.. , C. P. Putnam' a Sona, N. Y.,
1916, is as 1ts title suggeate, brief, but uaetul.

lated by Decoursey

w.·

It is trana-

Thoma, former member of the Baltimore Stock

Exchange and ot the Consolidated Exchange ot New York.
PAMPHLETS which, when checked against other factual mater!•

ala do not savor of a biased viewpoint, and which therefore are
of value, are: Pan1oa !E:2: Depreas1ona, issued by State Title and
Mortgage Company, New York, 1935J N. Johannsen,

- ---

!!!!. Comip.g Cr1a1a

and How to __.__.
Meet ._.....
It, N. Y. 1906, which is a plea tor eurrency re-

~

form; Harriet Heald, Hiatorz

2f

Industrial

De~resaiona,

published

by the Cleveland Trust co., 1912, attempte to show that the financial difficulties or the depression ot 1907-08 paved the way for
the Federal Reserve System.
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NEWSPAPER articles were of exceedingly great value as primary sources.

The Chicago ;Qaily Tribune and the

~

rn Dailz

Tribune, all 1saues for the months or October and November,
1907, contained a wealth of material through which one might
follow the daily progression ot affairs, throughout the eountr,y.
PERIODICALS proved to be vivid sources.

Among these were:

Alexander Noyes, "Articles in Finance", Forum, Forum Pub. co.,

----

N. Y. (Jan 1908); editorial in The Nation, New York Evening

co.,

Post

N. Y., (Nov. 1907); and·~ Spectator~·• edited by

John Baker, London, (Oct. 26, 1907).

The latter periodical,

which is sprinkled with English wit, is quite illuminating,

THE POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM
For material on the Postal Savings Banks, one may consult
Edwin

w.

Kemmerer, PoAtal Savings, Princeton Univ. Presa, 1917.

This ie a very detailed explanation of the system, accompanied
by an appendix which contained the full text of the Postal
Savings Act.
PERIODICALS: Vols. 90, .91, 92 and 94 or Outlook, contain
editorials on the Postal Savings Banks.
is an article written
Banks."

by

In Vol. 91, (Jan. 1909)

John Harsen Rhoades, "Postal Savings

It is very informative.

In!!!!_ Independent, published
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by Independent, N. Y., (Nov. 5, 1908) Vol. 65, ia George Von L.

Meyer, "Much Needed Legislation", in wnich he discusses the advantages

or

the system, as applied 1n other countries.

In the same

publication 1a Charles E. Sprague, npoatal Saving• Banks".

Then

we find Harold Stone, "The Postal Savings-Bank a Suggestion",
North American Review, North American Review Pub. Co., N. Y.,
(Apr. 19, 1910) Vol. 191.

!h!.

Craftsman, Gustav Stickley, edi-

tor and publisher, B. Y., (Apr. 1908) Vol. 14 contains the
editorial, "Postal Service Extenaion--What Postal Banks and a
Cheap Etficient Parcel Poat Would Mean to the Farmer and Wage
The Arena, A Twentieth Cent'!IX Review !l.! Opinion, Albert
Brandt Pub. Co., Boston, (Mar. 1909) Vol. 41, includes an ed1·
torial, "Postal Savings-Banks and the Interests ot the People,"
and a publication

or

the Commercial National Bank ot Chicago,

conta1na, "Objections to a Postal Savings Bank," Address by
George B. Roberts, President of that institution, delivered before the Minnesota State Bankers Association, at its Annual
Meeting, (June 15, 1909).

In the Congressional Digest, (Dec.

1931) Vol. 10, is "Postal Savings System", an Extract from
Pamphlets issued by the United States Poatoffice Department.
DOCUMENTS too are splendid sources.

Remarks by Senator

Bourne, advocating the establiebment of Postal Savings Deposi-

98.

toriea, are to be found in
(Mar. 5, 1910).

For the text

!11. United states

!!2. Housea

!:.!.

gt_ America,

or

----Concurrent Resolutions
the Act, see Statute& at

~ ~

Cop.gresa, Government Print. Office. Wash. 1911.

Vol. 36, part I; and Hearings Before
!!!5!, Currenc;r

Record, 61 Oong. 2. Seas.

Additional material appears in the 60 Copg. 2.

Seaa.(Jan. 6, 1909).
Lars~

~ongreasional

u. s.

~

Committee

_2!!

Banking

Senate 63 Cone;. l. Seas. Vol. 3.

THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Books previously mentioned, but which contain material relative to this topic are:

Frederick Bradford, Money

~

BankinSJ

Charles A. Conant, ! lilatorz ££. Modern Banks .2! Issue; and Davia

R.

~wey,

Financial Hiatoq

.2! ~United

Statea.

Special worke on the Federal Reserve System ares Henrr Jonea

-------·-

----- ----- -- .............................
......_.__..._
Carter Glass, An Adventure in _________
Constructive

Ford, Wood:rtow Wilson The Man and His Work, D. Appleton and co.,
N.

y., 1915• which gives the attitude or Mr. Wilson on the matter

of currency reform;

Finance, (Doubleday Page and Co., Garden City, N. Y., 1927J
which is very splendid material written by a sponsor

Wm. G. P, Harding, Formative ·Period

£?.!.

or

the Act;

!!°!!. Federal Reserve

.§z!.-

tem, (Boughton Mifflin co., 1925,) tells of the organization of
-the
board and outlines the functions of the Federal Reserve
Banke; and 11. Wilson Harria, President Wilson

.!!!!.

Problem

~

99.

!!!!

Policz, Headl91 Bros., Ltd. London, 1918, which 1a brief', but

good.
Edwin

w.

Kemmerer, !!!!, A.B.C •..J?! !!!!.. Federal Reserve Syatem,

Princeton Univ. Preas, 1926, prefaced by Benjamin Strong, then
Governor of Federal Reserve Bank ot New York; J. L. Laughlin.

!!!!. Federal Reserve
N.

Y.,

~· ~

Origin

~

co.,

Problems, Macmillan

1933; Edward Lewia, ! History .2!, American Political

Thousht !£2!!

~

!!!£~~World!!:£.,

Civil

and Robert L. Owen, !!!!, Federal
1919, are very helpf'ul.

Macmillan co., 1937;
Century Co., N. Y.,

Reserve~.

Mr. Owen waa United Statea Senator trom

Oklahoma, Chairman ot the United States Senate Committee ot
Banking and Currency.
Other worthwhile publication• ares

Joseph P. Tumulty,

~

--

-

row Wilson .........
As I __....._,
Know .-.........
BimJ Paul M. Warburg, The Federal Reserve
System, Its Origin~ 9rowth, Macmillan ·co., N. Y. 1930. Vol. l;

......._..

-

William Allen White, Woodrow Wilson, -The ...........
Man Bis Times, ....,._
Bia ......___...
Task,
Houghton Mifflin co., Boston, 1924; Henry Parker Willia,

~

Federal Reserve System, Roland Preaa, N. Y., 1923, with,.. an introduction by Hon. Carter Glass, who was chairman of the Houae Banking Committee 1913-18; and Charles M. Wiltse, !h!, Jeffersonian

Tradition

!!!

American Democrac7, The Univ. of North Carolina

Preas, Durham, N.

c.,

1935.
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PERIODICAL material ot value is:

Dr. E. A. Goldenweiser,

"Highlights in Histo:r;r of American Banking

Legislation"~

Consres•

sional Digest, (Dec. 1931) Vol. 10; J. M. Dagier, "Bank Failures,
The Problem and the Remedy", Harpers Magazine, (Apr. 1931) Vol.

----

162; editorials 1n The Nation, Vols. 97 and 98; and Outlook,
(Mar. 7, 1914) Vol. 106.

NEWSPAPER used waa the New York Tribune for September, October and December, 1913.
DOCUMENTS were used tor the sources of discusaione tor and
against the Act.
Prooeedinsa
6886.

The Congresa1onal Record, was invaluable.
;

~Debates £.!..

For the text

or

See

63 Cong. l. Sese, Also 71 Cong• 3. Seaa.

the Federal Reserve

--- --

Act,

consult The

---the direction ot the Board ot Governors of the Federal Reserve

Federal Reserve Act As Amended to October 1935, compiled under

~~--- ---~----

~-----..........

System in the Oft1oe of its General Counsel, United Statea.
Gov•t Print. Ottice, Wash. 1935.
DEPRESSION OF 1929
Of the aeeondaJ:t'y sources used, two have been mentioned,
namely, Bruce and Bradford.
in Bernard Fay, Rooaevelt
Boston, 1933.

Additional information may be tound

.!ru!!!!. .America, Little Brown and co.,

Mr. Fay gives the idea that America thrives on

101.

oriaea.

A conc1ae bit of material ls to be found in Paul H. Doug-

las, Collapse

~

Qy:cle, The Lakeside Press, Chicago, 1933.

---1930, makes an attempt to appraise the crash of 1929.

Irving

Fisher, The Stock Market Crash and After, Macmillan Co., N. Y.,

-

Stagg Lawrence, Wall Street

~

Joseph

Washington, Princeton Univ. Presa,

1929, discuasea the Problema of the Federal Reserve Board in 1929.
P~RIODICALS

were ot great help.

Frederick A. Delano, "Our

Recent Crisis and the Future", Review

.2£

Reviews, Review ot Re-

views Corp. N• Y., (Dec. 1932) Vol. 86, contained much useful
material.

An

editorial whioh la fairly good was found in !!!!_

Tablet, The Tablet Office, London, (Nov. 2, 1929).
gives the English viewpoint, aa doea

Sees Herselt",

s.

Thia ot courae

K. Ratol1fte, "How America

!.!!.! Spectator, (MAJ' 28, 1932) Vol. 148J and Norm.an

Crump, "The American Banking Cria1a",
Arter, (Constable and

co.,

~Nineteenth

Ltd., London) (Jan.

193~)

Cent1:117 !!2,
Vol.113,

which deals with the banking angle ot the depression.
In Current B1sto!"I, are two articles: Bernhard Oatrolenk,
·~

the Banks Collapsed", (May,

193~)

Vol. 38; and Alexander D.

Noyes, "The Stock Market Panic", (Dec. 1929) Vol. 31.
Deep insight ae to the extent
period is expressed editorially in,

Co., N. Y., {Dec. 1929) Vol. 337.
~ellent

or

speculation during thia

!!!!. L1V11?:£i Age, The Living Age
Previously mentioned, but ex-

for this phase of our work are: Jobn M. Dagier,

lot,,
nchallenge to the Banke•, World'a

.!2.£!1 (Oct.

1931) Vol. 80J ant

the Borth .American Review, Vol. 229.
A ver., tine

on the Reoonatruotion Finance Corpopa.

art1~le,

t1on and 1te act1v1t1ea 1 ia, Jeaae H. Jonea, "B11l1ona Out and
Billion• Back", I!!! Saturdy: Bv•nle&

l.2!!• The Curtie Pub. co.,

Philadelphia, (June 12, 1937).
As it has been alread7 stated, NEWSPAPEftB, recording the
da117 eventa, are moat valuable aa well aa illuminating.
which were 1ndeapena1ble were:

Daill Tr1buneJ

Chicag~

Those

The Chic!io Dailz !!!!,J Ch1C!gO

Herald Examiner; !a!

.!!.! !2£! Herald

------

Tribune; The Bew York TimeaJ and London T1aea1 tor October,
1929, and ror Februarr and March, l9S2.
DOCUMEITARf aouroea available were: Hearing• Betore

Committee ga Banking ,!.!!!! Currenoi 1 House

~

s£ ftepreeentat1vea,

72

Cong. 1. 8•••• on H. R. 9203, United Statea Gov't Print. Otfioe,

- --- --- ----

Waah. (Feb. 12, 1932)J The Federal Reaerve Bulletin, (Mar. 1932);
and Consreea1onal Record 72 Cong. 1, 8•••• Vol. 7§ 1 part '•

INSTABILI'l'Y OP BANKING
Bradtord, Mon!l
of the theaia also.

!2!% 2£. !!:!!

~

Banking, waa helpful tor thia portion

c. c.

Colt and 11.

s.

Ke1,h 1 28 pqa, A Bla-

Banking Oria1a, Greeberg Pub. Co.,

x.

Y., 1933 1 1a

10&.

what may be called·a daily hiatol'J' of events dealing to a great
extent with the banking or1a1a, particularly in Michigan.

Of

------

interest 1a Herbert Hoover, .American Ideala Versus the Hew Deal,
Scribner Presa, N. Y., (no publisher's date).

Walter Lippmann, ;nterEretat1ona 1933•1935, Selected and
Edited by' Allan Nevina, Macmillan co., N. Y., 1936, is an excellent compilation of concurrent writings by a man, who because of
h1s years ot experience with leading newspapera in New York, did
Certain parts ot his book

much to aid the Roosevelt campaign.
are pertinent to our subject.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, .Q!!

.2'!!£. Waz, The Jobn Da1 co.,

N. Y., 1934, is the President's own explanation of the s1gn1ticant events ot the first year of his adm1niatrat1on.

The banking

situation is only one of the many detailed discussions.
In the field ot PERIODICALS, World Tomorrow, The world
Tomorrow Inc., N. Y., (Mar. 1933) Vol. 16, oontaina two 1plendid
editorials:

"The Banking Cria1a•, and ·•1fho Are Slacker•"•

Volumes 38, 39, and 41 of Current Historz, are helptul.

'
E. P.

Brown, "America Meets the Emergency" and "Roosevelt Takes Control" are in Vol. 38; J. T. Flynn, "Wantedi Real Banking Retorm•
in Vol. 39.

Mr. Flynn 1a very highly regarded, if one accepts ·

the opinions registered in I!!!,

~

Rev1ew D16!at.
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Editorials b1 Albert Shaw, Review ot Reviews, Review ot
Reviews Corp., N. Y., 1934, Vol. 90, contain information of value.
Jesse H. Jones, "Billions Out and Billions Back", Saturdar !'!!!!ins !2,!!1 (June 12, 1937) is of use here also.

Others which are

helptul are: Raymond Gram Swing, "The Inevitable .American Cuaah",
Fortn15htl1 Review, Fortn1ghtl1 Review O.f.f1ce, London, 1933, Vol.
139, PP• 409-21; Guy Greer, "Wanted& Real Banking Reform",
HarR•r• Masazine, (Oct. 1933) Vol. 16?; PP• 633-35; and editorials in Congre1aional Diseat, Vols. 11, 12, and 13.
The Nation,
Nation Inc., N. Y., 1933, Vol. 136, contains
---editorial matter ot interest. The Business Week, McGraw-Bill
-Marc. A. Rose,
Inc., N. Y., (Mar.-Apr. 1933) edited
The

Pub.

fur~

by'

niahes good editorial mat,erial.

The

May

issue also has articles

on bankings and the June issue contains matel'ial on the new GlaaaSteagall Bill.

Vol. 151 ot

Ia!.

Spectator,

previous~1 mentione~,

gives again the English view ot the American banking situation.
~

!!.!.

Re2ublic, Vols. 73 and 74 contains fair editorials on

our subject.

These have been cited betore.

NEWSPAPERS wh1eh were moat enlightening are:

Chicago Dailz

---

Tribune, London Times, Manchester Guardian, and Tbe New York
The New York T1mea waa
------news relating to the-Banking Act

Times, ror the month of Karch, 1933.
also

or

ot 1933.

great value for 1te

March 1932 and June 1933 1aauea were used for this.
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DOCUMBITARY aoUl'c•• are again, Oongreaa1onal Record

.7!

Congreaa, I S•••• Vol. 77, ot wb1oh parts l, 3 and 6, were ve17

_

helptul for material on the Bankins Act ot 1933; and

-----

Reserve Act Aa A.mended

___

to __.
October,
................,... 1935.

The

.!a!.

Federal

latter was used tor

the text of the Banking Act ot 1933.
The cloa1ng quotation ot Chapter VII 1a taken tram Charle•
Warren, Bankruptcz

,!!'!~United

Presa, Cambridge, Mase. 1935).

Statea,(Barvard University
In thia book Mr. Warren aketchea

the great depressions of the past and gives a desor1pt1on ot tb.e
attempts to secure adjustments b7 leg1alat1on.
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